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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of the Army's decision to cease 
production of Ml main battle tank's engine, on its' tank fleet readiness. Additionally, 
this thesis will present and analyze three possible alternatives to preserving the tank 
engine industrial base with respect to applicable factors facing the Department of Defense 
(DoD), Congress and industry. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The tank engine industrial base is unique and essential to the readiness of the U.S. 
Army. Although there are other producers of gas turbine engines in domestic and foreign 
market places, the AGT 1500 has several product-specific attributes, which make it stand 
out as a unique turbine engine. The end of the Cold War and our decisive defeat of Iraq 
in the Gulf War brought about a decline in defense spending. Thus, the Army is having 
to make some difficult decisions in the procurement of its equipment. An unstable world 
with growing arsenals of high tech weapons is placing ever increasing pressure on U.S. 
defense planning and procurement. The need for a ready and capable tank force will be 
paramount in America's ability to influence the actions of other countries which deviate 
from acceptable behavior. Allowing the tank engine industrial base to go "cold" could 
jeopardize the future readiness of the tank fleet. Congress has shown its commitment to 
keeping the tank engine industrial base "warm" by providing funding that will allow it to 
remain operational for the near term. 
Currently, the only open factory in the United States capable of producing the 
AGT 1500 gas turbine engine is located in Stratford, Connecticut. The Stratford Army 
Engine Plant (SAEP) is the only facility to ever produce the AGT 1500 gas turbine 
engine. The last AGT 1500 gas turbine engine is scheduled to come off the production 
line in the spring of 1995. After this date, there are no foreign or domestic requirements 
for the engine. The Ml tank upgrade program that is currently underway, does not require 
the installation of newly-manufactured tank engines. Should the Army decide both to let 
the tank engine industrial base go "cold" and to postpone the Block III tank, it is possible 
that the ability to produce a newly-manufactured tank engine will cease until sometime 
after the year 2000. 
As a result, the producer of the engine, AlliedSignal, is attempting to "right-size" 
its operation and gain a portion of the engine overhaul work. Consequently, the decision 
both to let the manufacturing of new tank engines cease and to embark on a plan to utilize 
depot and contractor overhauled engines in the M1A2 Upgrade Program, has sparked an 
interesting and at times, emotional debate between the AlliedSignal, DoD and Congress. 
Throughout this debate, the Army has developed numerous courses of actions to help it 
make the best decision regarding the preservation of the tank engine industrial base. 
The following are three options for maintaining tank engine production 
capabilities that the Army evaluated: 1) Mothball or sell the current facility, move 
operations to another facility and find another prime contractor, 2) Mothball or sell the 
current facility, move operations to another facility while retaining AlliedSignal as the 
contractor 3) Retain AlliedSignal as prime contractor, downsize both the current facility 
and workforce to meet current Army requirements. Even these proposed alternatives may 
not be able to keep the tank engine industrial base in existence long enough to transition 
into the Block III Main Battle Tank and its new propulsion system. The U.S. Congress 
instructed DoD to direct funding to AlliedSignal to perform engine overhaul work. This 
additional work is intended to keep the contractor operational for the near term. DoD has 
not fully embraced this redirection of funds, as they contend it more expensive than 
utilizing existing Government depot assets to perform this work. 
Hence, the decisions DoD is making, concerning both how to keep a critical 
technological capability available and how to hold equipment readiness at the highest 
possible levels while meeting budgetary constraints, typifies some of the problems it 
must grapple with as the drawdown of military forces continues. These decisions are not 
easy ones.   There are political and National Security considerations which play key roles 
in decisions that affect our defense industrial base preservation. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this thesis are to provide the Army, DoD, and Congress an 
insight into what should be done with the only tank engine factory in the United States. 
By utilizing a case study format, a process to analyze this issue is presented that can be 
applied to other programs that are experiencing related concerns and issues. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary 
Upon completion of new Ml tank engine production in 1995, should DoD either 
keep open, on a limited production basis, the only tank engine production facility in the 
United States, or close it? 
2. Subsidiary 
• How will the absence of tank engine production affect readiness of the 
armored forces? 
• Will skilled workers be lost? 
• How long will it take to retrain the force? 
• What will it cost the Government both to close the facility and to reopen it? 
• What will the impact of plant closure have on the subcontractor base? 
• How will the spare parts requirements for existing tank engines be satisfied? 
• Under what conditions should DoD attempt to maintain a minimum tank 
engine production capability for contingencies as mobilization, or foreign 
military sales (FMS)? 
• How long will it take to reestablish a closed engine production line and 
produce sufficient engines to meet demand? 
E. RESEARCH SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This case study focuses only on U.S. tank engine production and the effects of 
DoD acquisition strategies and plans on a single source within the defense industrial base. 
As production of the engine is scheduled to cease in 1995, but the anticipated service life 
of the Ml series tank will extend beyond the year 2010, the scope of this thesis will be 
limited to the impact on mobilization of the industrial base and tank fleet readiness through 
the year 2010. It might also be noted that a Block III tank may be ready for production 
near the year 2000, and that it will most likely employ an engine different than the current 
AGT 1500. As this issue is currently being analyzed and updated by the Army, some of 
the data utilized at the time this thesis was written, may have been superceded by more 
current information. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis research and analysis will examine the industrial base issues and defense 
acquisition policies that affect decisions concerning preservation of the tank engine 
industrial base. The thesis will then develop courses of action on methods proposed by 
DoD, the contractor and Congress to sustain the tank engine industrial base. This thesis 
will analyze the effects of the courses of action with respect to the following issues: 1) 
effects on the tank engine industrial base workforce, 2) costs required to implement each 
option, 3) effects on the subcontractor base, 4) impact on the mobilization requirements, 
and 5) impacts on operational readiness. 
G. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Background and policy information was obtained from the Defense Technical 
Information Center (DTIC) and Defense Logistic Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) 
databases, professional journals, and published studies. Information was also obtained by 
conducting a personal visit, as well as corresponding with, Program Manager (PM)- 
Abrams Tank System and U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, Warren, Michigan. 
AlliedSignal, located in Stratford, Connecticut was an additional source for technical data. 

H. BACKGROUND 
A.     THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 
The economic and political issues surrounding the preservation of the tank engine 
industrial base, are problems DoD has faced after each major war of this century. 
Throughout U.S. history, we have mobilized our industrial base to provide the machinery 
of war to defeat our enemies. The decision makers in this country follow the ending of 
hostilities with the dismantling of the defense industrial base. During these postwar times, 
DoD and industry have attempted to develop the optimum level of industrial base. 
Without an effective industrial base, the systems necessary for our Armed Services to 
deter aggression and defeat our enemies will not be in place. In 1988, the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), published a study defining the industrial base 
as the 
...aggregate ability to provide the manufacturing, production, technology, 
research and development and resources required to produce materials for 
the common defense of the U.S. [Ref. 1, p. 12]. 
The CSIS study assumes any firm that provides goods for national defense, whether 
commercially-owned and operated, Government-owned and operated, domestically or 
foreign-based, is part of the industrial base.  This study also introduces the belief that the 
defense industrial base contributes to deterrence of war in three ways.    They are: 
peacetime efficiency, technological competitiveness, and flexibility in a crisis. 
The industrial base consists of the following three elements: 
•   Full-Service Prime Contractors:     Contractors that provide manufacturing 
capacity,   as  well  as   system  technical   support,   design  and  engineering 
capabilities and logistical support.    These prime contractors may operate 
Government-owned and contractor-operated (GOCO) or contractor-owned 
and contractor-operated (COCO) facilities.  There are three active full-service 
prime contractors servicing the tracked vehicle industrial base [Ref. 2, p. 2]. 
• Vendor Base: Contractors or subcontractors that manufacture subsystems or 
end-item assemblies to support the tracked vehicle industrial base. Included in 
the vendor base are two arsenals: Watervliet, which manufactures cannons; 
and Rock Island, which manufactures gun mounts and recoil mechanisms. 
• Depots: Supply support through the disassembly, overhaul and repair of 
tracked vehicles and components. There are currently three active depots 
supporting the tracked vehicle industrial base: Anniston Army Depot (Heavy 
Armor), Red River Army Depot (Light and Medium), and Letterkenny Army 
Depot (Howitzers). 
At the outset of the Cold War, the U.S. defense planners realized that matching the 
Soviets one-for-one in equipment and manpower would not be a cost-effective means of 
deterrence. The DoD and Congress believed that developing superior technology was the 
best tactic to win the Cold War. The industrial base's ability to develop superior weapon 
systems allowed the Armed Forces to field weapon systems of higher technology than the 
Soviets. With the end of the Cold War and communism's failure in the Soviet Union, 
many persons felt that continuing this course of action was not appropriate. Today, some 
people believe that with a lack of a superpower country to threaten us militarily, 
preservation of the tank engine industrial base is not warranted. A review of recent 
events in Panama, Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, Rawanda, North Korea, and Iraq, illustrates that 
deterrence may not always preserve the peace. Apparently, the U.S. industrial base needs 
to remain capable of providing rapid reconstitution of the equipment necessary for the 
U.S. military to deploy and successfully defeat any enemy force. 
B.       THE TANK ENGINE INDUSTRIAL BASE 
AlliedSignal produces the AGT 1500 gas turbine engine for the Ml tank at the 
Stratford Army Engine Plant (SAEP), Stratford, Connecticut, a GO-CO facility. The 
SAEP also produces engines for Army helicopters, Navy Landing Craft Air Cushioned 
(LCAC) vehicles, and commercial applications.   AlliedSignal utilizes both Government 
and contractor-owned equipment to produce these engines. The Government has a total 
investment of approximately $278.9M (37,187 inventory items) in SAEP, including $49M 
worth of industrial plant equipment (IPE) [Ref. 3, p. 1], Key Government-owned 
equipment includes: flexible manufacturing systems, computer numerically controlled 
(CNC) Machining, and unmanned material handling systems. There are 214 pieces of 
Allied Signal-owned machinery and equipment used for AGT 1500 manufacturing [Ref. 3, 
p. 1]. Examples of unique machinery utilized in the production of the AGT 1500 are: 
CBN (Cubic Borizon Nitrade) gear tooth grinders, laser welders, horizontal and vertical 
CNC machinery centers, and a laser machining center. AlliedSignal paid $1.654M in 
1992, for the use of Government IPE in its commercial production of engines. SAEP has 
the capacity to produce 3,000 turbine engines per year. The plant also has the capability 
for füll engine testing of turboshaft, turboprop, turbofan, and industrial turbine engines. 
AlliedSignaPs annual sales are estimated at $682M, of which $45 IM was derived 
from SAEP engine sales (1993). AlliedSignal generates the balance from its other 
facilities, through the sale of spare parts, and remanufactured, overhauled, and other 
engine production. In AlliedSignal's strategic plan, it forecasts sales shrinking yearly from 
$45IM in 1993 to $340M in 1997. This plan assumed continued new AGT 1500 
production for Phase I of the Ml A2 Upgrade Program, remanufactured engines for Phase 
II, the FMS to Saudi Arabia, and spares. Reductions in military procurements and the 
Army's decision not to purchase remanufactured engines, forced AlliedSignal to 
reevaluate their ability to remain in the business of producing AGT 1500 engines and spare 
parts. The 1993 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) did not have any requirements for 
new U.S. military engines beyond FY93. The M1A2 Upgrade Program includes engines 
overhauled at Anniston Army Depot. 
If the 1993 FYDPs were implemented, excluding AlliedSignal from the M1A2 
Upgrade Program, the production line would go "cold" in May 1995 [Ref 4, p. 2]. 
AlliedSignal then would consider moving the production of commercial engines to a less 
costly facility. Military engine production remaining at SAEP would generate $35-50M a 
year [Ref. 3, p. 2]. This amount would not be sufficient for AlliedSignal to continue 
support oftheAGT 1500. 
An extended production line shutdown results in: certain skills, equipment, and 
facilities not being ready or available for contingency production or FMS requests. After a 
one-year shutdown, the restart costs are estimated at $42M (1991 Abrams Closure Study 
with Smart Shutdown). TACOM estimates that it will take AlliedSignal three years to 
ship the first engine to the Army after regeneration of the production line begins. An 
important factor to consider is the lack of any other qualified producer of the AGT 1500 
engine. There are several manufactures of gas turbine engines available, who, given the 
required level of funding and sufficient time, could produce the AGT 1500. 
The departure of Allied Signal's engine production capabilities from the tank 
industrial base, leaves only Anniston Army Depot capable of supporting the Army's tank 
engine overhaul and repair needs for the next 20-25 years. Table 1 depicts the services 




Anniston Army Stratford Army 
Depot Engine Plant 
R&D X 
Sub-system Integration X 
Manufacturing X 
Remanufacturing X 
Technology Infusion X 
Overhaul & Repair X X 
Vendor Management X 
Wartime Deployment X X 
Field Support X X 
Table 1. Tank Engine Industrial Base Capabilities 
If production of the AGT 1500 ends in May 1995, the Army would have the 
option of divesting of its investment in SAEP. The Army could offer to sell the key IPE 
to AlliedSignal rather than renting it. AlliedSignal may not elect to acquire some of the 
Government equipment due to its uniqueness or age. 
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C.     THE AGT 1500 GAS TURBINE ENGINE PROGRAM 1976-1992 
Prototype development of an experimental new main battle tank for the Army, the 
XM1, began in the 1970's. The Army conducted design competition between Detroit 
Diesel Allison Division of General Motors Corporation (powered by Teledyne continental 
Motor's AVCR 1360-2 diesel engine) and Chrysler Corporation Defense Division 
(featuring AVCO Lycoming Division's AGT 1500 Turbine Engine). The Army subjected 
both engines to considerable testing and evaluation. The testers placed primary emphasis 
on performance, maintenance, weight, and size factors [Ref. 5, p. 1]. 
Teledyne Continental Motor's prototype tank engine differed from diesel engines 
utilized in previous main battle tanks. This diesel employed variable compression ratio 
(VCR) pistons and unisteel cylinders. These components, in addition to high boost 
pressure operation, reduced the size and weight of the diesel, while providing higher 
power output than comparable diesel engines. 
The Army developed the AGT 1500 turbine engine to apply to armored ground 
systems, the advantages of low engine weight, long life, and low maintenance. These 
desirable attributes were demonstrated by aircraft turbine engines currently in service. 
AVCO Lycoming Division employed high inlet temperature, blade cooling, and 
regeneration to improve fuel economy of the turbine engine. 
From 1973 to 1976, the Army conducted validation tests and studies to determine 
which technology to incorporate into the XM1 tank. Although riskier and not as mature 
as diesel engine technology, the turbine ultimately defeated the diesel. At the time, the 
Army believed that the turbine would provide better long-term potential for growth in 
performance and durability [Ref. 5, p. 1]. On November 12, 1976, the Department of 
Defense selected Chrysler's tank proposal, utilizing the turbine engine. The Department 
of the Army and DoD Engine Review Committees delayed production of the engine until 
September 1979. Both agencies considered the turbine's test mileage less than desirable 
and recommended additional testing of the engine. AlliedSignal delivered 110 engines 
from September 1979 through August 1980.    AlliedSignal's second year production 
11 
schedule was 30 engines per month [Ref. 2, p. 21].  As of November 1993, AlliedSignal 
had produced approximately 11,081 engines for the U.S. Army. 
The U.S Army Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) procures spare and repair 
parts for the DoD wholesale inventory based on needs forecasted by the Requirements 
Determination and Execution System. In 1992, TACOM realized that there was no future 
requirement for the manufacturing of new AGT 1500's. There was a concern that due to 
elimination of the need for production, materials due-in under existing contracts would 
exceed forecasted requirements. When these conditions occur, the system generally 
recommends termination of orders that exceed the maximum quantity authorized to be on 
hand and due-in. Table 2 illustrates the amount of engines and modules that were 
considered in May 1992 to be in excess of requirements. 
TACOM also procures spare and repair parts for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
customers. TACOM included within its yearly engine production requirements, those 
AGT 1500's designated for FMS, as well as those engines destined for other DoD 
requirements. Thus, it was very important for the planners at TACOM to consider the 
impact on FMS engine production of a decision to curtail procurements for DoD 
requirements. 
In May of 1992, on-hand and due-in AGT 1500 engines and four related modules, 
exceeded their system-computed requirements objectives [Ref. 6, p. 3]. TACOM 
employed as part of their termination decision process, the Economic Contract Cutback 
Model. The model illustrated to TACOM that termination of the engines and the rear gear 
box modules would not be economical. TACOM management decided to utilize a partial 
termination of the contract that applied to excessive quantities of the other three engine 
modules. TACOM did not terminate any AGT 1500 engines due-in to DoD inventory. 
They based their decision on both indications the model produced, and the belief that 
termination of production would have a negative effect on the cost of engines designated 
for FMS. Table 3 depicts the costs to terminate the contract and potential savings of this 
















Engine $ 386,270 378 799 421 $162.60 
Forward 
Module $104,610 238 721** 483** 50.5 
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Module $200,797 238 617** 379** 76.1 
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Gearbox $92,154 168 419 251 8.1 
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Table 2. Excess Engines and Modules, 1992 [Ref. 6, p. 4]. 
* Replacement price is the average cost based on previous purchase and is used as the 
value of the AGT 1500 engine 
** Includes the due-in quantities being considered for termination. Total value of assets 
exceeding the Requirements Objective after planned termination of $34.4M of 
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$           5.90 
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$           0.40 
$34.40 $25.60 $8.80 
M$ 
Table 3. Potential Savings From Contract Termination [Ref. 6, p. 3]. 
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1. DoD Inspector General 
The DoD Inspector General (IG) reviewed TACOM's strategy for addressing the 
excess modules problems and recommended changes to the selected course of action. The 
IG advised TACOM to use excess engines and to assemble excess modules into complete 
engines. These engines could fill some of the FMS requirements for new AGT 1500's. 
By utilizing this approach, TACOM would use approximately 310 engines currently in 
inventory to partially satisfy the 814 engine FMS requirement for 1993 and 1994. The 
approximate value of the 310 engines was $130M. 
TACOM considered this option, but asserted that it must sell the engines to FMS 
customers at standard price as required by law, which includes a mark-up for TACOM's 
handling costs. This mark-up increases the cost of the engine to one substantially higher 
than the current contract purchase price per engine ($512,984 versus $413,953) [Ref. 6, p. 
4]. TACOM was unaware of a DoD policy that grants the Army Chief of Staff the 
authority to deviate from standard price to provide assets to FMS customers. 
Using this information, the DoD Inspector General recommended that TACOM 
reverse its decision to partially terminate the procurement of excessive quantities of AGT 
1500 modules. The IG stipulated that TACOM must first determine if it was economical 
to use the modules to satisfy FMS engine requirements. 
The IG did take into account that TACOM might incur some additional costs by 
using excessive quantities of DoD assets to meet the FMS need. The additional costs 
would arise from modifications to the engine and the assembly of the respective modules 
into a complete engine. The reduction in the number of engines produced for FMS would 
also lead to contract termination costs. The IG estimated that TACOM could avoid the 
estimated $25.6M termination costs related to excess modules due-in, by selling the 310 
engines valued at $130M to FMS customers [Ref. 6, p. 5]. 
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2.        Partial Contract Termination 
The Department of the Army (DA) thoroughly evaluated the DoD IG 
recommendation to reverse the decision to partially terminate the AGT 1500 Modules. 
TACOM analyzed the recommendation with regard to the following terms: industrial base 
retention, spare asset availability, cost, ability to sell spares to FMS customers, and future 
AGT 1500 engine and module requirements. TACOM deemed the continued purchase of 
excessive quantities of AGT 1500 engine modules not practical for the following reasons: 
• TACOM had no assured requirement for the terminated modules because of 
the uncertainty and risk associated with sales to foreign customers. 
• There were no requirements for additional spares because stock on-hand was 
already beyond the Requirements Objective (RO), and reductions in Army 
force structure could further decrease demands. 
• TACOM expected a net recoupment of $17.4M, based on a total contract 
value of $34.4M and an estimated termination liability of $17.0M. 
If TACOM reinstated the modules, the net recoupment would be less due to the 
added cost of the additional line-items needed to convert modules to complete engines 
[Ref. 4, p. 2]. The net effect of the terminating modules was to reschedule other 
deliveries. The revised schedule mitigated the cost impact of the termination by delaying 
the impact to the last years of contract deliveries (1993-1994), where less cost had been 
incurred. This produced the same results anticipated by the IG. 
TACOM also concluded that stock levels in excess of the RO would actually 
increase as the Army force structure declined. Therefore, it initiated termination action to 
cancel modules remaining on contract, but not delivered as of July 1992. The only 
exception was eleven reduction gear boxes. A comparison of termination costs versus 
reinstatement costs, demonstrated that a continuation of the termination was less costly. 
TACOM, faced with the lack of assured requirements for terminated contract modules, 
stock on-hand identified as above the RO, and the recoupment of $17.4M, supported 
termination of the modules as the prudent business decision to make. 
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3.        Sale of Spare Engines and Modules 
TACOM agreed to reevaluate the IG's recommendation to sell excess quantities of 
AGT 1500 engines and modules to satisfy FMS requirements. TACOM felt that this 
option was not possible to implement because of the requirement to maintain the tank 
engine industrial base until the year 2001. Other considerations which weighed heavily in 
their analysis were: prospect of future U.S. and FMS orders, providing warranty 
coverage, AlliedSignal's resistance to support engineering change proposal (ECP) 
applications, and retesting of engines. 
In making their evaluation, TACOM studied the initial asset and contract delivery 
schedule as shown in Figures 1 and 2 (p. 21). Figure 1 displays the asset position and the 
pre-termination delivery schedules for 1992 through 1995. Assets on-hand include the 
substantial requirements projected to support operations Desert Shield and Storm. As 
mentioned earlier, the short duration of the war and the Soviet Union's decreased threat 
projection, seriously curtailed the demands for engines and modules. Figure 2 illustrates 
the asset status after termination of the modules, the post termination delivery schedules, 
and the annual reduction in engines. 
Army Regulation 710-1 defines excess stock as assets beyond the maximum 
retention level. Using this definition, TACOM did not consider the engines and modules 
cited by the IG as excess. TACOM assumed the "excess" cited by the DoD IG was assets 
beyond the RO. Table 4 depicts the asset picture as of February 4, 1993. Table 5 
illustrates the due-in status, to include Direct Cite, Defense Business Operating Fund 
(DBOF) assets, and terminated modules. The DBOF spare (FMS) engines and modules 
were assets scheduled for direct shipment to foreign customers. Implementing regulation 
AR 37-100-91 directs DBOF to fund assets per the customer pass-through requirement. 
FMS customers reimburse DBOF for its expenses from a direct cite reimbursable account 
upon delivery of assets. TACOM scheduled the sale of the engines to be at the FMS 
price, with all add-ons, not at the standard Army Master Data File (AMDF) price. FMS 
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Maximum Total 
RO Retention Assets 
Engine 434 975 851 
FWD 296 1519 483 
Rear 279 1764 439 
RGB 186 814 418 
AGB 163 872 301 
Table 4. Asset Status 4 Feb. 93 [Ref. 4, p. 4]. 
Due-in Picture 
Contractual Engine Forward Rear RGB AGB 
FMS (Direct Cite) 
Production/Spares 
CY 93/94 738 0 0 0 0 
DBOF 
Spares (Army) 0 0 0 11 0 
DBOF Spares (FMS) 
(Direct Ship) 74 59 63 54 0 
Terminated* 
Spares (Army) 0 123 62 0 74 
*DoD IG Recommended Reinstatement 
Table 5. AGT 1500 Delivery Quantity Reduction, As of 1 Feb. 93 [Ref. 4, p. 9J. 
customers were unwilling to incur any termination costs caused by TACOM's cancellation 
of requirements. TACOM's cancellation of contracted deliveries would result in DBOF 
bearing the full termination cost of the contract. This led TACOM to believe that using 
assets from stock would drive FMS customers to reduce their engine requirements. This 
in turn would reduce DBOF projected income. As DBOF's schedule for foreign 
shipments was for the near term, TACOM felt it wise not to terminate the assets on 
contract that were designated for FMS customers. TACOM's analysis did not consider 
designated FMS direct shipment spares as possible termination candidates. TACOM 
determined that it was not economically feasible to sell spare engines from stock to FMS 
for the following reasons: technical factors, industrial base retention and cost. The 
following is a description of each factor: 
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a. Technical Factors 
(1) TACOM does not update engines in stock to the most 
current ECP configuration. Additionally, AlliedSignal does not provide a failure-free and 
systemic defect warranty for these engines. FMS customers were not willing to accept 
engines from stock because of these factors. The contractor was not willing to support: 
configuration upgrade, retesting of engines, and warranty coverage on engines and 
modules in Army stock. TACOM would support configuration upgrade and retesting, but 
did not want to become involved with warranty issues on the engine and modules. The 
complexity of warranty issues, and their unfamiliarity with providing warranties were 
TACOM's justification for this position. 
(2) TACOM has no established organizational structure to 
develop and administer a warranty as required by the FMS customer. With the 
downsizing of its workforce, TACOM did not want to incur additional workload for its 
employees. 
(3) There is little data concerning the AGT 1500 engine's 
ability to be repeatedly rebuilt and overhauled. TACOM expressed a concern that with 
this lack of data, there could be a problem with long-term reliability and cost-effectiveness 
of engines and modules overhauled multiple times. Therefore, with the AGT 1500's 
ability to be repeatedly overhauled in question, TACOM was reluctant to utilize quantities 
of engines from stock. The retention of the new engine production capacity minimizes the 
risk of needing new engines in the out years when the industrial base had ceased to exist. 
b. Industrial Base Retention 
(1) The AGT 1500 manufacturing base is essential to tank 
manufacturing capability. The Program Executive Office, Armored Systems 
Modernization, (PEO, ASM) required the engine manufacturing base remain viable until 
completion of the Ml Series upgrade program in the year 2001. 
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(2) At the time of the analysis, there were potential U.S. and FMS 
requirements. Under this schedule, AlliedSignal planned final engine delivery for 
December 1994. Based on an 18 month Production Lead-time (PLT), the reorder point 
necessary to avoid a break in production was June - July 1993, [Ref. 4 p. 5]. 
(3) The sale of new engines from stock could have caused a break 
in production, for each one sold from stock would have correspondingly reduced the 
number required from the production contract. 
(4) A break in production generates a nonrecurring restart cost of 
$42M, in addition to the engine unit price, and requires 24-36 months for the Army to 
receive the first engine. 
(5) Prepositioned war reserve requirements were unknown and 
there was uncertainty concerning stock funding of depot-level repairables and its impact 
on wholesale demands. 
c. Cost 
(1) The following is a list of cost factors used to evaluate 
possible courses of action: 
• Termination: The actual coat of the terminated quantities. 
• Equitable Adjustment: The cost adjustment applied to the remaining contract 
quantities due to the termination. 
• Severance Benefits: Costs associated with layoff of the workforce. 
• Idle Plant: Costs associated with maintaining the idle facility. 
• Line Reduction and Closeout:    Costs associated with ending AGT 1500 
production. 
• Spares  Conversion:     Costs  of converting  spare engines to  production 
configuration. 
(2) TACOM developed four proposed selling prices:  Contract, 
AMDF, Material Management Proposed, and Minimums. 
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AR 37-60 provides the guidelines to establish the AMDF selling price. 
The Material Management Proposed selling price was based on average 
contract prices, ECP applications, and warranty. 
The minimum selling price was based on an exception to AR 37-60, which 
authorizes sale at 50 percent of AMDF if: 
- Asset totals are beyond the Authorized Force Acquisition Objective 
(AFAO). 
- Sold only to FMS Customer. 
Table 6 illustrates the cost impact and net recoupment associated with each 
selling price. 
Except for the contract selling price, all other selling prices do not include a 
systemic defect warranty. It was the Army's position that becoming involved 
in providing warranties to FMS customers would incur an unacceptable level 
of financial and political risk. 
DOD IG Recommendation 
Recoupment 
Contract AMDF Proposed Minimum 
Total Cost $71.2M $71.2M $71.2M $71.2M 
Recoupment $202.8M $191.0M $163.3M $112.7M 
Net 
Recoupment $131.6M $119.8M $92.1M $41.5M 
Table 6. AGT 1500 Delivery Quantity Reduction [Ref. 4, p. 12). 
The issue of satisfying FMS tank requirements by utilizing AGT 1500 engines and 
modules from stock was extremely complex. The Army estimated that there were 
potential cost savings ranging from $41.5M to $131.6M. The Army believed that other 
factors outweighed the cost benefit. The Army also considered the following: the 
retention of AGT 1500 industrial base, uncertainty of future war reserve requirements, 
impact of stock funding depot level repairables, financial and political risk in providing 
warranties, costs associated with breaks in production, and the reliability of rebuilt engines 
and modules.   With these considerations in mind, the Army elected to retain new spare 
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engines and modules in inventory.   This would minimize the near-term risk of meeting 
demand for new engines and modules. 
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Figure 1. AGT 1500 Engine and Module Delivery Schedule As of March 1992 [Ref. 4, p. 10]. 
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Figure 2. AGT 1500 Engine and Module Delivery Schedule As of December 1992 (Ref. 4, p. 11]. 
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D.       PLANNED   ACQUISITION   STRATEGY   TO   SUPPORT   THE   M1A2 
PROGRAM 
The Army examined the amount of engines in-stock and due-in against projected 
requirements, both U.S. and FMS, and determined that requirements did not warrant 
continued new engine production. Even though the FYDP did include the M1A2 Main 
Battle Tank Upgrade Program, the Army decided not to purchase newly-manufactured 
engines. TACOM viewed overhauled engines as the most cost-effective option to fulfill 
requirements for M1A2 propulsion systems. The Army planned to use only ANAD- 
overhauled engines in the M1A2 program. AlliedSignal interpreted this decision as 
signaling the end of their ability to remain the producer of the AGT 1500. The 
determination to eliminate the procurement of new engines was to many, the beginning of 
the end of the tank engine industrial base. Congress, after receiving many conflicting 
recommendations regarding acquisition strategy, directed the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense to commission the Defense Science Board (DSB) to form a blue-ribbon panel. 
The blue-ribbon panel examined all issues surrounding the preservation of the tank engine 
industrial base. The following is a listing of the DSB's findings and its recommendations 
[Ref. 7]. 
1.        Findings 
• The Army needs to maintain support engineering, critical sole-source spare 
parts, and logistics capability at SAEP and retain access to AlliedSignal's 
unique knowledge and capabilities and company-owned proprietary processes. 
• Restructure and down-size SAEP. 
• The long-term viability of SAEP depends on AlliedSignal's commercial work. 
This commercial work is uncertain. 
• Dual-use lease procedures are required at AlliedSignal. 
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There is minimal and inconclusive data on engine durability; however, it does 
indicate the need for a continued engine durability improvement program that 
requires AlliedSignal engineering support. 
There are three options which should be considered (with some possible 
variations) for the SAEP. 
Option A: Current Baseline (Plan to retain a minimal SAEP) 
- Current engineering and parts funding streams 
Option B: Current Baseline Plus (Plan to retain downsized SAEP) 
- Current engineering and parts funding streams 
- Some maintenance work transferred from Anniston 
- Partial cost-sharing of downsizing 
- Engineering funding for evolutionary engine upgrade program 
Option C: (Do Not Plan to Retain SAEP) 
- Current engineering and parts funding to alternate source 
2.        Recommendations 
The Task Force recommended that the issue of a significant restructuring and 
down-sizing effort at the dual-use SAEP continue to be pursued by the Army 
and AlliedSignal. 
Immediately pursue dual-use leases for the SAEP.   A dual-use lease would 
permit AlliedSignal to continue Government work, while also conducting 
commercial work at the facility. 
The Army needs to maintain a "critical mass" of support engineering and 
logistics capability at AlliedSignal for an extended period (even with no 
production), due to AlliedSignal's unique knowledge and capability.    The 
Army must plan for and fund this effort. The Army should plan to fund design 
work for potential future upgrades of current engines. 
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• The Army may need to transfer additional workload to SAEP. AlliedSignal 
requires this additional workload to maintain a viable overall operation, as well 
as potential equipment upgrade and or manufacturing capability. The Army 
must plan to fund certain mission-critical spare parts, such as recouperators, 
that only AlliedSignal produces. 
• The Army should pursue Option B as a reasonable hedge for risk reduction in 
the near-term and as a step toward a potential long-term solution. This option: 
• Adds costs of approximately $9M per year for engineering support and 
$6M for a one-time downsizing of SAEP (for the Government's share) 
• Assumes $20M per year of overhaul work transferred from ANAD to 
SAEP 
• Includes development of dual-use lease arrangements for key elements 
of the industrial base 
• Includes DoD release of $17M designated for long lead-time orders 
(FY94 money) 
• The Army should assess trade-off studies of turbine versus diesel 
engines for all future heavy vehicles, including replacement of AGT 
1500. Additional funding (estimated at $2-4M/yr.) is required for 
independent, funded analyses and comparisons to assess the viability of 
each option. 
3.        The Army's Position 
The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army, (Research, Development and 
Acquisition), George E. Dausman, reviewed the blue-ribbon panel's recommendations and 
stated the Army's position as follows: 
• There is neither a requirement for additional new engines, nor any firm 
prospects for foreign military sales of M1A2 tanks which might generate a 
requirement for new engines. Development of future heavy tracked vehicles is 
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not dependent upon the viability of SAEP. There are turbine and diesel engine 
designs, as well as manufacturing expertise, available within industry that could 
meet future Army needs. 
• The Stratford Army Engine Plant is an unnecessary part of the industrial base 
infrastructure. It is an overage, overcapacitized, Government-owned facility, 
ill-suited to what the Army really needs: efficient, low-rate parts production 
[Ref 8, p. 1]. 
• For this reason, the Army viewed with skepticism the blue-ribbon panel's 
recommendation to provide funding and a transfer of overhaul workload to 
maintain a "critical mass" of expertise at SAEP. The Army concluded that this 
option required either a reprioritization of existing programs or additional 
budget authority. The transfer of workload from the depot increased cost to 
levels not budgeted for, and raised political opposition. 
• The Army did concede that there was a need for continued logistical support 
from AlliedSignal, namely component supply, and some engineering support 
for both fielded engines and the depot overhaul program. 
The Program Executive Officer, Armored Systems Modernization (PEO, ASM), 
did not totally concur with Mr. Dausman's memorandum for the following reasons: 
• The PEO did agree that there were numerous private enterprises capable of 
designing and manufacturing turbine engines. His point of contention was that 
SAEP's proven and qualified process had taken years of tests, field data, and 
improvements to successfully develop and qualify. Ground combat vehicles 
have unique requirements that other turbine engine applications do not 
duplicate. Relocation of the SAEP operation to another site or source would 
require a costly and time-consuming qualification process. Moving to another 
site would be like starting with another contractor. The PEO anaylzed the 
reconstitution issue, and concluded affordable new engine production would be 
paramount in a time of emergency. 
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• The Army development programs for future heavy tracked vehicles are using 
the SAEP facilities. The turbine engine currently under consideration for 
incorporation into the Advanced Field Artillery System and Future Armored 
Resupply Vehicle (AFAS/ FARV) is benefiting from corporate memory and 
lessons learned during the AGT 1500 program. The Army will use previous 
experiences in the SAEP Automotive Test Rig for the AFAS and FARV risk 
reduction program. 
• The Army needs to thoroughly analyze any option that would provide the 
required tank engine support. A decision to not place additional funds into 
SAEP is premature. The Army must support the least-cost option. Pursuit of 
higher-cost options could jeopardized current programs. 
• The most important argument regarding the retention of SAEP is the Army's 
need to maintain readiness of the current tank fleet. In order to meet this goal, 
an experienced engineering and logistics support staff, as well as an operating 
and qualified manufacturing capability for critical spare parts, must be retained. 
E.        FY95 BUDGET 
The congressional committees concerned with the defense of our nation, decided 
to preserve the tank engine industrial base. Congress based its decision on the findings of 
the Defense Science Board's (DSB) blue-ribbon panel (BRP) commission. The National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, directed the formation of the BRP. The 
commission study entitled "Task Force on Tracked Vehicle Industrial Base" recommended 
several actions to attempt to preserve a tank engine industrial base. The BRP 
recommended that the Army fund $20 million of engine overhaul work at the Stratford 
Army Engine Plant (SAEP), in addition to continuation of funding for necessary spare 
parts and engineering support. This measure, along with a progressive dual-use leasing 
arrangement, and an aggressive plant downsizing effort, could permit AlliedSignal to 
preserve operations at SAEP.   The DSB noted that the success of this initiative depends 
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on the development of commercial business at SAEP. The BRP acknowledged the 
development of commercial business is uncertain. The direction to the Army from each 
committee was as follows: 
1. House Armed Services Committee (HASC) 
The HASC demonstrated a concern that DoD had not adequately addressed the 
preservation of the tank engine industrial base in its industrial plan. At the time of 
consideration, the DSB's findings were not available to the HASC. Absent the DSB's 
findings, the committee believed that DoD may need to take action to preserve the tank 
engine industrial base in FY95. The committee noted an availability of prior year funds for 
this purpose. The committee issued a directive to the DoD, instructing the re- 
programming of funds should the DSB's findings indicate a need for support of the tank 
engine industrial base beyond 1995. 
2. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) 
The DSB's findings persuaded the SASC of the need to maintain a tank engine 
manufacturing capability. The SASC directed the obligation of remaining fiscal year 1994 
funds, and authorized an additional $15M in fiscal year 1995 funds for system technical 
and engineering support, engine durability upgrade efforts, and plant downsizing. The 
committee authorized $20M in procurement for engine overhauls at SAEP in FY95, as 
well as S15.3M for procurement of spares. The SASC directed the Army to pursue a 
progressive dual-use leasing arrangement for SAEP. Finally, the SASC permitted the 
Army to apply other funds, such as production base support, severance, and production 
continuity, to these efforts. 
3. House Appropriations Committee (HAC) 
The HAC received the DSB's recommendations and determined $15M should be 
appropriated for the Abrams sustainment program. Specifically, the funds were to be used 
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for both system technical and engineering support, engine durability upgrade efforts, and 
plant downsizing. It also directed the Army to pursue a progressive dual-use lease for the 
Stratford Army Engine Plant. 
4.        The Congressional Conference Committee 
The congressional conference agreement included $35M for the tank engine 
industrial base program as proposed by the Senate, instead of the $15M proposed by the 
House. The conferees agreed to dedicate $6M of this money for plant downsizing [Ref 
9]. The Army shall use $9M for system technical support and engine durability upgrade 
efforts. The Army shall use the remainder of the funds, $20M, combined with $12.6M of 
unobligated funds from the FY 94 program (a total of $32M), for engine overhaul and 
upgrade, service life extension, and spare parts. The Army and AlliedSignal shall jointly 
develop this program. The Army must report to the HAC and SAC on the specific details 
of any program subsequent to obligating funds. The program developed must illustrate 
future costs by category for the entire tank engine industrial base effort. Under this 
agreement the Army cannot use any of the appropriated funds for procurement of new 
engines. 
F.        OTHER INDUSTRIAL BASE ISSUES 
The following areas are possible alternatives to current business practices; either 
individually or in a combination of programs, that could help preserve the tank engine 
industrial base. Although some of them are in the conceptual stage, they have potential 
for expanding the options for tank engine industrial base preservation. These areas are 
possible ways for DoD and industry to conduct business in the future, where relatively 
small production runs and limited funding for programs will be the rule, rather than the 
exception. 
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1.        Conversion 
Conversion is the ability to utilize an item produced for a military purpose for 
civilian applications. A cursory look at the AGT 1500, reveals what would appear to be a 
commercial gas turbine engine. A closer examination however, shows only limited 
similarities to commercial variants currently in production. The AGT 1500 is a stand- 
alone military vehicular turbine in its own unique niche of size, horsepower, and capability. 
Therefore, AlliedSignal believes it could retain only a few components for use in either a 
commercial or another military sector. Closure of the production line could eliminate the 
tank engine's unique vendor base, manufacturing processes, and related workforce skills. 
This possibility increases the risk of not having the capability to either re-convert a 
product, or quickly reconstitute the production line. AlliedSignal admits there is a greater 
potential for conversion of its military aviation engines to commercial applications. 
However, AlliedSignal believes it may be difficult to obtain sufficient marketshare to make 
conversions cost-effective. Due to basic laws of physics and aerodynamics, one size of 
gas turbine cannot meet all requirements. The investment a manufacturer would need to 
make to cover the entire spectrum of applications is cost-prohibitive. Therefore, each gas 
turbine manufacturer selects niches in which to compete, that he feels offers his greatest 
potential for profit. AlliedSignal views their niche as full, and that future opportunities 
within the niche will be heavily competed. 
AlliedSignal believes that it is absolutely critical to retain a competitive commercial 
product. AlliedSignal pays rent for the Army tooling that it utilizes in the production of 
its commercial products. AlliedSignal states that the commercial product produced at 
SAEP absorbs over 30 percent of the fixed overhead costs that are not passed back to the 
Army. This aids in keeping the cost of military products as low as possible. 
As the military orders decrease in a fixed-capacity plant, AlliedSignal visualizes 
two options: 1) pass the unit cost increases directly back to the Army; or, 2) force the 
additional unabsorbed overhead onto the commercial product.    If the second option 
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occurs, it is likely that the commercial base will no longer remain competitive. Should the 
Army product bear the brunt of cost absorption, the cost of spares or original equipment 
will become unafFordable. Neither option is acceptable; therefore a smaller capacity 
facility, properly configured for a cost-efficient production rate, appears to be a viable 
course of action [Ref. 10, p. 3]. 
One method for a company to absorb fixed-overhead is to enter other industrial 
markets. A machine tool capable of making gears or shafts, could likely produce other 
similar components. AlliedSignal is exploring the possibility of expanding its business base 
by entering additional markets, such as automotive parts production. 
2.        Right-sizing of the Production Facility 
The U.S. Air Force transferred Stratford Army Engine Plant to the U.S Army in 
1976. Upon selecting the turbine as the engine for the Ml tank, the Army and 
AlliedSignal undertook the effort to upgrade the production facility to a state that would 
permit the efficient production of the engine. Throughout the 1980's, the Government 
and AlliedSignal jointly invested money under the DoD Industrial Modernization Incentive 
Program (EVUP) to modernize the facility. The effort resulted in a plant production 
capacity of 3,000 engines per month. The total integration included all aspects of 
manufacturing operations, assembly and test, information support systems, manufacturing 
equipment, material handling, and employee training [Ref. 10, p. 2]. The Government 
invested, through the period 1977-1992, S278.9M. During the same period, AlliedSignal 
invested $165.2M. AlliedSignal's sees its challenge as taking a plant currently sized for a 
capacity of 180 tank engines per month, and re-sizing it to a capacity of 10 tank engines 
per month. AlliedSignal estimates that the decrease in the number of AGT 1500's 
produced at SAEP, will increase the future cost of materials by approximately 20 to 30 
percent [Ref. 11, p. 8], depending on production levels. Therefore, the rightsizing of the 
facility must offset the material cost increases by increasing productivity and reducing 
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facility operating costs.     AlliedSignal believes that it can increase productivity by 
implementing the following changes: 
• Focus   on   fewer   manufacturing   commodities   through   make   or   buy 
reevaluations. 
• Improve management of the shop floor by upgrading the management system. 
• Eliminate excess machinery. 
• Reconfigure the shop floor to support reduced volume production. 
• Reprocess parts to accrue benefits of more capable machines and improved 
floor layout. 
• Retrain work force to upgrade manufacturing related skills. 
• Consolidate facilities of SAEP to reduce operating costs. 
The implementation of right-sizing SAEP, allows both the DoD and commercial 
vendor base currently involved with products in production, or a totally independent non- 
related manufacturing base, to utilize the excess plant capacity. AlliedSignal believes that 
the unused manufacturing capabilities within SAEP (test cells, laboratories, machine 
tooling) would provide support to numerous vendors and subcontractors. AlliedSignal 
also believes that unless the Government relaxes the restriction on commercial use of 
Government tooling, this action will be ineffective. The Government is attempting to 
remedy the situation through the implementation of dual-use leases wherever possible. 
3.        Dual-Use Leases 
The Defense Science Board's (DSB) blue-ribbon panel recommended a 
progressive dual-use lease be implemented at AlliedSignal's facility. The panel 
recommended that the Government share in the burden of downsizing the production 
facility. Under this plan, the Government would lease a portion of the reconfigured 
facility to AlliedSignal. AlliedSignal, meanwhile, would maintain technical skills and 
manufacturing capabilities at the production facility.   Underlying this action is the belief 
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that AlliedSignal's long-term survival is going to hinge on uncertain future commercial 
work. 
Jacques Gansler, who chaired the DSB's task force, states that the dual-use lease 
concept is likely to play an increasingly larger role in encouraging defense companies to 
convert to commercial work, while maintaining the defense base. It is important to note 
that there has been increasing congressional activity that could pave the way for 
progressive dual-use leases to become more prominent. The House's FY-95 defense 
appropriation's bill contains a provision that will allow "industrial facilities of the armed 
forces to sell articles and services to persons outside of the Department of Defense." 
Some who believe that dual-use leases are good for the preservation of the 
industrial base, cite that federal regulations regarding such arrangements are too 
prohibitive. The issues which the Government must resolve are: safety, responsibility, 
cost allocation, and equipment depreciation. Until the Government and industry resolve 
these issues, dual-use leases will remain viable, but lack the mechanisms needed to make 
them function properly. 
As a GOCO, SAEP is an integral part of the U.S. Army internal defense industrial 
base. The business base is directly tied to DoD procurement levels of either existing or 
new product lines. In this case, the commercial business is stable, but contributes a 
relatively small percentage of standard hours manufactured at the facility. The completion 
of the current contract will reduce AlliedSignal's business base to the production of other 
military and commercial engines. Therefore, the goals of a dual-use lease of the SAEP 
facility are to: 1) provide affordable military and commercial gas turbine engines 2) 
protect the gas turbine engine technology base, thus providing the capability to improve to 
existing engines, and to develop new engines 3) sustain fielded SAEP engines, which are 
rather substantial in number as depicted in the Table 7. As of December 1994, 




A proposed method of filling production capacity is the return of breakout spares 
to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), either by component, cluster of parts, or 
sub-assembly and assemblies. This could assure OEM quality control at all levels. 
AlliedSignal would provide subassemblies to the customer with a warranty. Return of 
breakout generates potentials saving to the customer from: reduced assembly time by 
Army units, quality control over vendor products, easier incorporation of design 
improvements (technology insertion), fielded product engineering support, and an OEM 
warranty [Ref. 10, p. 9]. 
Military 
Application Customer Engine Qty. 
Huey and Cobra 
Helicopters U.S. Army T53 19,000 
Chinook 




Guard LT101 300 
Landing Craft, Air 
Cushioned (LCAC) U.S. Navy TF40B 350 
Abrams Tank 
U.S. Army 
& Marines AGT1500 11,000 
Table 7. Military Engines Produced by AlliedSignal [Ref. 11, p. 4]. 
5.        Return of Depot Workload 
The returning of workload previously designated for depots is a very important 
area of contention between the Government and defense contractors. Normally, depot 
maintenance workload is mandated by law. Organic facilities perform 60 percent of DoD 
repair work during peacetime [Ref. 2, p. 12]. This requirement is not usually applied to 
upgrade and modernization programs. Traditionally, depots perform upgrades and 
modernization of systems. As the defense budget declines, industry believes DoD must 
utilize upgrade and modernization programs to sustain critical elements of the industrial 
base. 
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Defense contractors' point of contention is the Government depot network has not 
been shrinking at the same rate as the private industrial base. They believe this uneven 
shrinkage shifted the bulk of defense work into the hands of the Government. Private 
industry perceives some depots as aggressively seeking work traditionally performed by 
contractors. These infringements led industry officials to protest on the basis of not being 
able to compete on equal terms with depots. Industry attributes the unfairness of the 
current system of awarding contracts to the Government's: 1) stating the needs and 
writing the requirements, 2) holding the competition, and 3) selecting the winners [Ref. 
12, p. 38]. Costs and overhead are also calculated differently in the Government and 
private sectors. 
Industry feels the Government should be getting out of depot work and putting its 
workload back into private industry. Private sector industry believes DoD based the 
rationale for depots on a war with the Soviet Union, that would last several years. During 
this war, equipment damaged in battle would be returned to depots for repair, and industry 
would churn out new replacement systems [Ref. 12, p. 38]. Analysts project that the next 
war will probably be short in duration and will come with warning. This belief fosters the 
conclusion that the Government no longer needs a robust in-house capability to do repair 
and overhaul work on its equipment. Industry admits that a shift of depot work to private 
industry will not solve all the problems of lost defense contracts due to downsizing. 
Industry does believe increasing the amount of repair and overhaul workload will help 
preserve its capacity. 
It would appear that the Government and DoD are heeding the pleas from private 
industry. The Army has closed four of its eight major depots in an attempt to eliminate 
excess depot capacity. The downsizing of depots will allow DoD to maintain a core depot 
capability. The "core" will provide production capability and preservation of job skills. 
The retention of a skill's base will allow depots to provide surge capacity in time of crisis. 
Additionally, the retention of the "core" will permit the training of the depot personnel as 
expert buyers of services. 
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G.       OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO DoD, CONGRESS AND INDUSTRY 
The following three options to sustain the tank engine industrial base are among 
several that DoD, Congress, and industry have either proposed and are evaluating, or have 
been evaluated as of this writing: 
1.        Option One: The Army Should Mothball the Stratford Army Engine 
Plant After the Last AGT 1500 Gas Turbine is Built and Seek an Alternate 
Source for Overhaul, Spare Parts, Engineering, and Logistical Support 
Capabilities 
This option is based on the lack of requirements for newly-manufactured tank 
engines. Army analysis demonstrates that spare engines and depot-overhauled engines are 
sufficient to meet Army needs until the year 2015, when a new engine will be in service. 
This includes a complete layaway of SAEP, extensive layoffs, and complete termination of 
production. This option creates a loss of conceptual, engineering, sole- source component 
parts, and the management expertise associated with tank engine production. As a result, 
future re-starts would result in significant shifts in the learning curve. Should mobilization 
prove necessary in the future, the Army estimates it will take 48 months to bring 
production rates from 0 to 90 tank engines per month. This closure plan could also be 
catastrophic to vendors, forcing many either out of business or to shift their business to 
the commercial sector. 
There are gas turbine engine manufacturers capable of producing the AGT 1500. 
TACOM estimated that it would require $100M to recompete and develop another source 
capable of providing the services its desires [Ref. 13, p. 1]. The current technical data is 
not adequate for competition at the engine or module level. The Army estimates it will 
require 24 to 36 months, including First Article Test, to implement the alternate source 
[Ref. 2, p. 17]. In the interim period, the Army would require field support, system 
technical support, and logistical support. AlliedSignal will have to meet these support 
requirements. It is conceivable that it would be difficult to find a second source willing to 
provide such a service.    If the current projected workload is insufficient to provide 
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AlliedSignal with an adequate business base, it is logical to assume another source would 
probably not receive a satisfactory return on investment and choose to remain out of the 
field. TACOM's analysis of this option indicated that seeking a second source would be 
too inefficient, costly, and time-consuming. Therefore, the Army eliminated this course of 
action from further consideration. 
2. Option Two: The Army Should Mothball Stratford Army Engine 
Plant and Move Operations to Another Location Maintaining AlliedSignal 
as Service Provider 
This course of action allows the Army to retain the production of spare parts, and 
both the engineering and logistical support necessary to maintain the tank fleet's readiness. 
Moving operations to a COCO facility that has lower overhead rates results in lower 
product costs. The plan is to phase-out all actual new engine and module production. The 
smaller facility would maintain the capacity to perform overhaul work, conduct spare parts 
production, and possibly produce ten new engines per month. The disadvantage is that 
there would be no facility capable of rapid production of a large number of new engines. 
The Army would also incur the costs for: the idle facility at SAEP, investment in spare 
components to cover the interim, requalification of the workforce, and the possible 
schedule risk associated with the transition. 
3. Option Three: The Army Should Complete Production of New 
AGT 1500 Engines, Establish a Dual-use Lease, and Right-size SAEP 
This option allows for the sustainment of SAEP for the near-term and the retention 
of AlliedSignal engineering, sole-source component parts, logistical support, and 
reconstitution capability. The overhaul and upgrade of engines consists of taking an 
engine, overhauling it to specification, and incorporating the latest engineering change 
proposals. The expense of overhauling an engine is approximately one-sixth the cost of a 
new engine [Ref. 14, p. 5]. 
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This course of action maintains the industrial base and "core" workforce. The 
retention of the workforce will ensure the ability of the Army to conduct research and 
development. This research and development capability will provide engineering 
improvements to the engine. The improvements will provide the additional engine 
performance needed to meet the drain of power generated by vehicle weight growth and 
power requirement increases. 
Congress approved funding for this course of action in the FY95 budget. This 
course of action keeps engine production at current levels until all orders are filled. It 
allows AlliedSignal to remain in operation, at reduced capacity, and incorporates depot 
services from Anniston Army Depot as well. In conclusion, this option retains the 
industrial base, while providing uninterrupted support of the armor force. 
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ni. THE TANK ENGINE INDUSTRIAL BASE WORKFORCE 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
Gas turbine tank engine production requires skills in many disciplines that can be 
found throughout the gas turbine industry and industry in general. There are some skills 
that, although not product-unique, are so specific to AGT 1500 production that replacing 
them would pose some problems. Once lost, a large amount of training time for personnel 
and their certification would have to be allotted to revive their skills. AlliedSignal is 
concerned that if the tank engine industrial base were allowed to go "cold", skills normally 
passed from senior craftsman to their juniors, would be forever lost. 
The workforce at SAEP is a diversified group that is totally integrated into the 
manufacture of both commercial and military gas turbine engines. In the 1980's, the 
facility evolved from "job shop" production, where similar machines were grouped in a 
process-oriented fashion, to "group technology" production. The Industrial Resource 
Enhancement Program (IREP) guided the development of group technology centers, 
where "ownership" of quality was passed to each individual machine operator. The 
acquisition of this corporation by AlliedSignal Engines fostered further refinement by 
introducing just-in-time production cells, which incorporate the continuous improvement 
process, also known as "Kaizen" [Ref. 15, p. 1]. The objective of this process is to 
increase response to customer demands, reduce inventory and costs, and increase quality 
and customer satisfaction. These production cells require multi-process machine 
operators that have diversified skills. In the downsizing of SAEP, the transfer of skills is 
of major concern. Failure to properly transfer the necessary skills could lead to reduced 
product quality and increased costs. Training costs related to the downsizing of the 
workforce and increasing the flexibility of those workers remaining, will most likely 
exceed $1M for the required two-year training program [Ref. 15, p. 1]. 
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B.       WORKFORCE ISSUES 
The Stratford Army Engine Plant employs approximately 2000 employees who 
conduct research and develop, design and operate tank engine manufacturing equipment. 
The major issue affecting the tank engine industrial base workforce is worker training and 
certification. This section will discuss the workforce structure and the necessary training 
and certification requirements. 
1.        Manufacturing and Manufacturing Support 
In the manufacturing area there are now approximately 25 classifications involved 
in the manufacture of turbine parts. In an attempt to increase workforce flexibility, this 
number reflects a reduction from fifty-one previous classifications. Table 8 lists these 
classifications and required certifications. The four classifications involved in certifiable 
processes are: 
a. Flame Sprayer and Welder 
Both classifications are required to submit test specimens at routine 
intervals to maintain certification. Analysis of the specimens is performed by the 
Materials Laboratory and certification issued only after successful completion of testing. 
Formal and on-the-job training (OJT) is conducted to advance personnel to the required 
levels. Most flame spray and welding processes involve extensive test specimen control 
along with exhaustive non-destructive testing (NDT). This is a closed-loop system that 
requires corrective actions be taken automatically when failures are noted. 
b. Spinner 
This is a skilled trades classification which requires formal trade school 
training. A formal apprenticeship program accepts entry-level individuals who then 
progress toward journeymen and master levels.  There is a shortage of this craft in the 
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marketplace and skill development must be conducted within the organization in order to 
attain the highest proficiency levels. 
c.        Non-Destructive Test (NDT) Inspector 
This classification participates in the acceptance of critical process yields 
prescribed by military and commercial specifications. Three levels exist within the 
classification for operation, leading and training, and interpretation of critical defects. 
Yearly testing of all inspectors is required to maintain job certification. Processes include 
X-ray, fluorescent penetrant inspection, magnetic particle inspection, acid etch inspection, 
ultrasonic inspection, eddy current inspection, and dye check inspection. [Ref. 15, p. 3] 
These four classifications are not easily identifiable in the job market and 
would require extensive training to duplicate. Training times to develop these skills are 
estimated to exceed four to six months. 
Cert. Approx. 
Classification Type Req'd Pop. 
EDM/Drill Operator Mfg. No 18 
Machine Operator Flexline Mfg. No 15 
Machine Operator Single Point Mfg. No 111 
Machine Operator Grinder Mfg. No 42 
Machine Operator Gear Grinder Mfg. No 7 
Cutter Grinder Support No 7 
Tool & Die Maker Support No 31 
Heat Treater Mfg. No 11 
Surface Finish Operator Mfg. No 11 
Polish & Finish Operator Mfg. No 23 
Flame Sprayer Mfg. Yes 3 
Plater Mfg. No 9 
Welder Mfg. Yes 25 
Sheet Metal Mfg. No 56 
Spinner Mfg. Yes 2 
NDT Inspector Inspec. Yes 17 
Stock Clerk/Material Support No 43 
Crib Attendant Support No 19 
Parts Packer Support No 24 
Plant Clerical Support No 21 
Material Planner Support No 34 
Timekeeper Support No 4 
Table 8. Manufacturing Workforce Classifications [Ref. 15, p. 2]. 
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2.        Assembly and Test 
AlliedSignal totally integrates the assembly and test areas in all engine programs. 
The two areas are separate and distinct from each other, but share a goal of meeting 
customer demands. Due to the depth and scope of the job, training that an employee must 
undertake to work in both the assembly and test areas is more extensive and 
comprehensive than that in manufacturing. Senior manufacturing-type employees 
normally fill assembly and test entry-level positions. AlliedSignal, in an effort to increase 
flexibility, reduced the number of classifications in this area from twelve to two. These 
classifications are listed in Table 9. 
Cert.             Approx. 
Classification Type  Req'd Pop- 
Assembly Mechanic Assy No 76 
Test Mechanic Test No 32 
Table 9. Assembly and Test Workforce Classifications [Ref. 15, p. 4]. 
AlliedSignal will retain at SAEP, the machine tools and processes capable of 
producing the AGT 1500. The difficulty in producing AGT 1500 engines lies within 
industry's ability to retain necessary skills in its workforce when actual production is not 
taking place. For a period of time, the necessary skills will reside at SAEP in "core 
capability." The "core capability" consists of the personnel required to sustain fielded 
engines while SAEP is at a production rate of zero military engines per month and zero 
military modules per month. During this period AlliedSignal will retain the minimum 
capability to produce military engines and modules. Unfortunately, these skills will most 
likely disappear with the passage of time. AlliedSignal identified the critical labor skills at 
SAEP most at risk of loss as follows: 
* Spin Lathe Operator * Electron Beam Welder 
* Fusion Welder * Laser Operator 
* Gear Cutter * Operator Laser Operator 
* Flame Spray * Electron Beam Welder 
* Radiology Technician 
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C.       WORKFORCE ANALYSIS 
This section will analyze the potential effects on the tank engine industrial base 
workforce of the two options remaining available to DoD, Congress and industry. 
1. Option One: The Army Should Mothball Stratford Army Engine 
Plant and Move Operations to an Alternate Location, Keeping AlliedSignal 
as the Service Provider 
As stated earlier, this course of action allows the Army to retain the production, 
engineering, logistical and spare parts support necessary to maintain tank fleet readiness. 
The Army anticipates that, by moving operations to another location, the expense of the 
support that it desires from AlliedSignal would decrease. The Army makes that 
conclusion based on the assumption that the new facility would be contractor-owned and 
operated. The Army also assumes that the facility's location will be in a geographic region 
where labor and tax rates are relatively lower. 
This plan includes a complete layaway of SAEP, extensive employee layoffs and 
termination of tank engine production. TACOM defines layaway as the process of 
retaining and storing industrial facilities that are no longer required to support current 
production. DoD could reactivate these facilities at a future date, should the need for 
continued production arise [Ref. 16, p. 48]. 
AlliedSignal estimated that 550 employees would be necessary to maintain the 
"core capability" to provide the services that the Army desires [Ref. 11, p. 12]. This 
would mean that layoffs of approximately 1500 personnel would have to take place. The 
number of layoffs could increase, if those personnel chosen to remain did not elect to 
relocate to the new production facility. The Government is contractually liable for human 
resource separation costs at SAEP. Human resource costs are defined as all costs 
associated with separation of contractor personnel and include: separation pay, health 
care, supplemental benefits, group insurance, pensions, and dental care [Ref. 16, p. 48]. 
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Should the government choose to implement this option, it can expect to pay $12M in 
human resource separation costs [Ref. 17, p. 22]. 
a. Advantages 
From a workforce standpoint, the large expense associated with 
terminating the majority of the tank engine workforce has few advantages. The lack of a 
requirement for newly-manufactured tank engines and the limited amount of engine 
overhaul work, does not provide justification to support a workforce sized to produce 
new engines. This option does afford the opportunity for the retention of at least some of 
the current workforce's knowledge and potentially lessens the impact on the re-learning 
curve. 
b. Disadvantages 
Because of the long training time associated with certain skills, the closure 
of SAEP would force those employees who were unwilling to relocate, to seek 
employment elsewhere, thus losing their expertise. Fortunately, AlliedSignal has enacted 
diversified training for its employees. This training allows employees either not selected 
for retention or unwilling to relocate, to actively compete within their job specialty 
elsewhere in the gas turbine engine industry. 
This option will also effect the senior engineers and managers at SAEP. 
This is critical to AlliedSignal, since the AGT 1500 has some unique design and operating 
characteristics. The importance of senior engineering knowledge was exemplified during 
the Gulf War. These experienced personnel deployed to the battlefield to assist the Army 
with logistical and engineering support of their engines. The possibility of the loss of this 
knowledge base could have a significant impact on future designs of gas turbine engines 
for military applications, as well as upgrades to the existing AGT 1500. 
Both options that the Army is considering call for the cessation of actual 
production of new engines.   The Army will retain the capability to produce at least ten 
44 
new engines per month at the SAEP or new facility. The loss of actual production will 
mean that a significant shift in the learning curve will take place. The learning curve 
reflects an increase in production efficiency and quality that generally leads to cost 
reduction of the item. Improvement in the learning curve is a result of workers and 
managers gaining familiarity with production processes. As the workforce becomes more 
familiar with the processes, they are more capable of identifying errors and rapidly 
implementing corrective actions. The amount of the shift will be dependent upon the 
ability to rehire those employees lost during the downsizing. As time passes, it must be 
anticipated that some employees will be forever lost due to retirement or unwillingness to 
leave their current employment. 
c. Conclusions for Option One 
The effects of total production termination, layaway of SAEP and moving 
of AlliedSignal to another location, are potentially the most devastating to the tank engine 
industrial base. The loss of at least 1500 employees from production-level through 
management-level will be felt in the loss of personnel skills, qualifications and experience. 
A break in production will result in both a loss of quality in the engine produced and 
decreased efficiency of production. The amount of time to retrain a "cold" base 
workforce capable of producing new engines is seven months for unskilled laborers and 14 
months for skilled laborers [Ref. 13, p. 2]. Even though the "core capabilities" are 
retained during relocation, the Army would experience a disruption in services as 
operations are established at the new facility. 
2.        Option Two: The Army Should Complete Production of New AGT 
1500 Engines, Establish a Dual-use Lease and Right-size SAEP 
This option permits sustainment of SAEP, for at least the near term, and provides 
the Army the ability to retain AlliedSignaFs production, engineering, and logistical support 
45 
capabilities.  This option also keeps the workforce at a familiar location, thus minimizing 
disruption of services provided to the military. 
a. Advantages 
The advantage of maintaining the "core capabilities" at SAEP is that there 
is no immediate loss of either production job skills or the engineering and support 
knowledge base. The complete retention of the "core capabilities" enables the contractor 
to have a knowledge and skill base that will greatly improve the quality of the training that 
new employees would receive. By not relocating the production facility and the 
workforce, the contractor will not have to retrain the workforce and requalify his 
production processes. The Army estimates that this action will save S7.7M (FY 95 & FY 
96) [Ref. 17, p. 17]. 
b. Disadvantages 
As with Option One, the loss of skilled workers could be critical if full 
regeneration of the production line became necessary. The training and certification of a 
workforce whose size is large enough to produce 90 engines per month, would take 
approximately eighteen months. Should reconstitution prove necessary, the inexperience 
of the workforce would likely hamper efficiency and quality of the engine during the initial 
stages of production. This projected initial lack of efficiency and quality will most likely 
be accompanied by higher engine costs. This observation is also applicable to Option One. 
The high overhead rates at SAEP, which are attributed mainly to its 
geographic location, could eventually lead to a loss of engineering capabilities. Should the 
amount of Government workload be insufficient, AlliedSignal might have to eliminate 
engineering services for the AGT 1500 [Ref. 17, p. 18]. 
46 
c. Conclusion for Option Two 
This option provides the best opportunity to retain the production and 
support workforce base. This retention of "core capabilities" provides the Army with the 
ability to maintain an industrial base that could be regenerated in a time of emergency. 
This course of action minimizes the risk of disrupting the flow of services currently 
provided by AlliedSignal and retains the ability to regenerate the production line. From a 
workforce perspective it is the least-cost option. 
D.        SUMMARY 
Option Two provides the best potential to preserve the tank engine industrial base. 
Option Two allows the AGT 1500 "core capabilities" to remain intact. There will be a 
loss of a large portion of the skilled workforce. However, there is a skeleton of a 
workforce that will remain at the facility. This remaining workforce, or "core", will 
provide the support that the Army deems necessary to maintain its tank fleet's engines. 
The "core" will be able to produce at least ten engines per month and will provide 
continuity and expertise should full regeneration of the production line be required in a 
time of emergency. This option provides for the continued improvement of the engine, as 
well as reducing the Army's risk of losing engine maintenance capability. 
Although Option One has many of the advantages of Option Two, it does have 
several important differences. This relocation of the facility increases the amount of risk 
to the Army. The movement to a new facility would create a disruption of spare parts 
production and support, thus jeapordizing tank fleet readiness. It would also add costs of 
recertification and workforce training. A new site would also have to meet the 
requirement of being large enough to support possible engine production. This additional 
space would most likely remain idle until circumstances required its use. The SAEP, 
which will be idle under this scenario, has the floor space to produce thousands of engines. 
In conclusion, terminating production will have a damaging effect on the skills and 
knowledge of the tank engine industrial base.  The lack of a requirement for new engine 
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production drives the Army to find an alternative that will provide logistical support, 
engine overhaul and upgrade capabilities, and emergency regeneration of the tank engine 
production line. The retention of a small, but competent and experienced workforce, will 
provide the Army the support it requires to maintain its tank fleet and tank engine 
industrial base. 
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IV.      COSTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the decline in defense spending, the costs of implementing any option is of 
paramount concern to the Army. This chapter will analyze the costs involved in executing 
the two options and their effects on preserving the tank engine industrial base. 
B. COST ANALYSIS FACTORS 
From 1992 to present, TACOM conducted in-depth analysis of costs related to the 
preservation of the tank engine industrial base. The scope of these studies included 
options to: 1) layaway the industrial facilities at SAEP for future use, 2) maintaining new 
engine production capacity; while retaining both critical equipment and an experienced 
workforce, 3) conduct overhaul and upgrade of existing engines. TACOM and 
AlliedSignal developed the cost estimates utilized in the analysis. 
1.        Assumptions 
During the formulation of these courses of action, TACOM made some basic 
assumptions that have bearing on the costs presented. They are: 
• AlliedSignal will support the Army's AGT 1500 support requirements. 
• AlliedSignal's support capability is vital to the Abrams tank fleet's readiness 
and engine overhaul program. 
• EPA liability applies to either option but cost impact is varied due to timing of 
implementation. 
• New engine and module manufacturing capability existence applies to either 
option. 
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2. Other Cost Considerations 
When presenting the costs of the overhauled engine and sole source parts, a 
number of variables impact on the price of the services charged to the Army. TACOM 
must take into account cost factors such as inflation, workforce training, engineering and 
logistical support, spare parts, and warranty considerations. 
3. Evaluating Factors 
TACOM utilized the following cost factors in the analysis of the two options to 
preserve the tank engine industrial base: facility projects, equipment removal, 
environmental clean-up, human resources, closure penalty, program management, 
maintenance and caretaking of SAEP, AlliedSignal engineering and logistical services, and 
AlliedSignal spare parts production. 
a. Restoration Projects 
Restoration projects include the costs of building and grounds upkeep and 
maintenace. It includes actions such as roof repair, and upgrade and replacement of 
equipment. 
b. Equipment Removal 
This cost includes the planning, disconnecting, packaging, crating, 
handling and shipping of Government-owned equipment. 
c. Human Resource Costs 
As discussed in the previous chapter, human resource costs involve the 
payment of separation pay, health care benefits, supplemental benefits, insurances, pension 
plans and dental care. 
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d. Closure Penalty 
This cost is a contractual obligation incurred by the Government for the 
reduction in production rates. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.249-2 
Termination for Convenience of the Government and FAR 52.249.9 Default, provide 
guidance to agencies in determining and calculating termination costs. 
e. Program Management Costs 
Program management costs are derived from requirements to coordinate 
both internal and external office functions. It also includes cost tracking of inventory, and 
preparation of reports to maintain schedules and budgets [Ref. 16, p. 65]. 
/ Maintenance and Caretaking Costs 
These costs include: utilities, maintenance, security, fire protection, and 
the staff necessary to maintain the facility once it has been shutdown. 
g.        A UiedSignal Engineering and Logistical Services 
The costs associated with engineering and logistical service includes the 
amount of funding that must support AlliedSignaFs technical base. The annual system 
technical program incorporates the engine durability improvement program, both depot 
and field support, and support of the technical manuals for the engine. The engineering 
support to production encompasses a service life extension program and spare parts 
manufacturing. 
h.        Environmental Clean-up 
Environmental clean-up costs are associated with the preparation of the 
facilities and grounds of SAEP. Before SAEP could be sold to a prospective buyer it must 
meet all EPA standards for toxic waste removal and disposal. 
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C.       COST ANALYSIS 
This section provides an analysis of the potential costs of the two options that 
TACOM is currently recommending to preserve the tank engine industrial base. 
1.        Option One: AHiedSignal Continues to Provide Services, but 
Relocates to a Different Facility 
In determining the costs associated with the implementation of this option, 
TACOM made the following assumptions: 
• The Government will not pay relocation costs for AlliedSignaPs commercial 
applications. 
• The Government will accept liability for the relocation and requalification of 
recouperator production capability, as well other related Government costs. 
• Relocation of the facility will necessitate a spare part build ahead program. 
TACOM analyzed the option to terminate production and layaway SAEP with the 
understanding that support of the AGT 1500 will remain necessary to the year 2015. At 
the end of this period the Army expects to field another tank engine. Cost of the total 
layaway at SAEP is found in Table 10. As displayed in Table 10, the total closure cost is 
estimated to be S757.3M. The majority of the costs associated with implementing this 
option are derived from both engineering and logistical support, and spare parts 
production procured from AlliedSignal. 
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Option 1 ROM Closure 
Cost-$M ESC 
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Sys. Tech Spt. 
Spare Parts 
Subtotal 
Total 39.2 68.5                105.6 616 30.4 757.3 
*Does Not Include Long Term Environmental Remediation-$422M ESC 
Table 10. AGT 1500 Industrial Base, Cost of Option One, As of January 18,1995, [Rcf. 19, p. 41. 
a. Advantages 
The advantage of this option is that production and support of the AGT 
1500 does not require a GOCO facility. A modern COCO facility, properly configured, 
can produce parts more efficiently and with less overhead than parts produced at SAEP. 
TACOM estimates that by adopting this course of action the Army will save 
approximately S388M over the next 20 years [Ref. 17, p. 29]. 
b. Disadvantages 
From a cost standpoint, it is very expensive to close the SAEP. The Army 
must invest $74.9M in a spare part build-ahead program. This program will provide the 
spare parts necessary to meet Army requirements during the period of facility relocation. 
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The Army would also be responsible for paying $14.2M in FY95 and FY 96, for 
requalification of production processes and retraining of the workforce [Ref 17, p. 25]. 
Placing SAEP back into operation after a one-year layaway would cost the Army $42M. 
This option also has the greatest potential for the largest EPA cost. It will cost the Army 
more to conduct EPA projects that will bring the SAEP facility and its grounds to required 
standards. 
c. Conclusions for Option One 
This course of action becomes less costly over time. The data presented 
are estimates, based on current policies of DoD, AlliedSignal, and Congress. The proof of 
the assumption that a COCO facility is less costly to run, and that anticipated savings will 
be passed back to the Army product, is a major factor. There is an additional risk 
associated with this course of action. The costs of closure are scheduled to be spread over 
FY 95 and FY 96. Should the requested amount of funding not be appropriated, the 
Army and AlliedSignal may be forced to execute a less than adequate closure process, 
potentially leading to increased future restart costs [Ref. 16, p. 69]. 
2.        Option Two: The Army Right-sizes SAEP, Institutes a Dual-use 
Lease, With AlliedSignal Providing Production Capacity and 
both Logistical and Engineering Support 
In determining the costs associated with the implementation of this option, 
TACOM made the following assumptions: 
• The Army and AlliedSignal will establish a dual-use lease. 
• The Army will incur idle facility costs for buildings no longer in use. 
• AlliedSignal will absorb all leased facility costs. 
• The cost to reorganize and realign the facility will be reflected in AlliedSignaFs 
overhead rate. 
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This option, as with Option One, includes a one-time downsizing cost of $6M 
incurred by the Army. The main difference that this option provides is production 
capacity and retention of a "core" workforce. This would permit more rapid 
reconstitution of the production line in time of emergency. The cost of implementing this 
option is reflected in Table 11. 
As displayed in Table 11, the total cost of this option is estimated to be $1143.4M. 
The majority of the costs associated with implementing this option are derived from new 
production spare parts procured from AlliedSignal. 
a. Advantages 
From a cost perspective, this option provides the Army an opportunity to 
avoid a $7.7M charge in FY 95 and FY 96 for the retraining and requalification of the 
workforce and manufacturing processes. Additionally, this option has the potential of 
being least in cost for EPA projects. The Army's continued utilization of some of facilities 
at SAEP, will reduce the amount of area required to be cleaned to EPA standards. 
b. Disadvantages 
This option requires an up-front investment of S41.7M to prepare the 
facility and related operations for reduced capacity production [Ref. 17, p. 22]. The 
anticipated high overhead rate, will drive the cost of spares substantially higher than those 
in Option One. The increased cost of spare parts and the reduced Government workload, 
may lead AlliedSignal to terminate its engineering base. 
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Option 1 ROM Closure 
Cost-$M ESC 




0 0                    0 0 0 0 Relocation 
Closure 0 0                    0 0 0 0 
Build Ahead 0 0                   0 0 0 0 
Program Mgmt 0 0                    0 0 0 0 
Subtotal 0 0                   0 0 0 0 
Non-Recurrina Costs 
6 0                    0 0 0 6 Downsizing 
Restoration 2.5 2.4                  0 0 0 5 
Program Mgmt 0.5 0.5                  0 0 0 1 
Environmental* 0 8.8                 9.1 0 0 17.9 
Contract Liability 20 0                   0 0 0 20 
SLE Program 10 12.5                10 0 0 32.5 
Subtotal 39.1 24.2               19.1 0 0 82.4 
Recurrina Costs 
3 6.9                13.9 98.7 6 121.5 Maintenance 
Caretaker 0 0                   6.9 49.3 3 56.2 
Sys. Tech Spt. 10 6                  19.6 142.6 8.7 178.2 
Spare Parts 26.2 21.3                 69 588.7 35.8 705.1 
Subtotal 39.2 33.2              109.3 879.3 63.6 1061 
Total 78.3 67.4              128.4 879.3 63.6 1143.4 
*Does Not Include Long Term Environmental Remediation-$422M ESC 
Table 11. AGT 1500 Industrial Base, Cost of Option Two, As of January 18,1995, [Ref. 19, p. 5] 
c. Conclusions for Option Two 
The costs associated with this option hinge on the belief that although SAEP 
would be downsized, its overhead rates will be exceedingly high. The high overhead rate 
will be passed back to the Army in the form of higher costs for spare parts and logistical 
support. While this option is less expensive to initially implement, it does have the 
greatest potential for cost growth. 
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D.        SUMMARY 
From a cost perspective, Option Two provides the most cost-effective course of 
action for the Army to pursue. This option provides both the engineering and logistical 
support the Army requires. It also provides the production capacity that the Army desires 
for contingency situations and FMS. Option One is the most costly of the two options 
under consideration. As stated earlier, if the Army selects Option Two, operations will 
remain at SAEP until sufficient spares are produced. During this period the Army will 
have the opportunity to verify cost estimates presented in Option One. Should actual 
costs prove that continued utilization of SAEP is the most cost-efficient course of action, 
then the Army could opt to reverse its decision to relocate the facility. 
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V.       MOBILIZATION AND SPARE PARTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The chapter will explore the ramifications of the two options under consideration 
to preserve the tank engine industrial base with respect to mobilization and spare parts 
issues. As military operating budgets continue to shrink, the Armed Services must make 
difficult decisions on how to spend limited funds. Our military planners must see into the 
future and determine what the military needs for equipment will be in 20 to 30 years. 
They must use this vision to analyze the risks associated with allowing certain defense 
industrial bases to go "cold." Proper precautions and planning for mobilization and surge 
capacity of the defense industrial base can reduce the risk of being caught "shorthanded" 
in the next conflict. The issues of mobilization and surge planning are analogous for DoD 
systems. A thesis on a related topic, "A Comparative Analysis of Options For Preserving 
The Tank Industrial Base, " written by Juan J. Hernandez effectively defines these topics. 
Therefore, this thesis will not redefine the policies and procedures for DoD planning for 
industrial base mobilization and surge capacity in great detail. 
The defense planners must take into consideration the guidance concerning 
reconstitution of the defense industrial base as set forth in the National Military Strategy 
[Ref. 21, p. 24]. The document describes reconstitution as: laying away infrastructure, 
stockpiling critical materials, protecting the defense industrial base, sustaining a cadre of 
quality leaders, and investing in basic science and high-payoff technologies. 
B. MOBILIZATION OVERVIEW 
The issue of mobilization of the industrial base to provide the weaponry necessary 
to conduct warfare has fundamentally changed from the 1940's to present day. During 
World War II, the civilian industrial capacity was largely converted over to provide 
massive outputs of war materials. This rapid conversion of the industrial base was part of 
our national defensive strategy throughout the Cold War. President Reagan changed the 
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paradigm by stating mobilization was only a supporting capability for deterrence and the 
flexible response strategy [Ref. 16, p. 108]. The demise of the Soviet Union and the 
United States' increased role in humanitarian missions and peace-keeping operations 
have increased the need for a flexible defense industrial base. The maintaining of a 
defense industrial base will provide the foundation for future weapon systems 
development. 
Jacques Gansler, who headed the Defense Science Board's blue-ribbon panel that 
studied the Tracked Vehicle Industrial Base, believes the issue here is not mobilization, 
but the development of future systems. He asserts that DoD must concern itself with 
preserving the capability to conduct research and development and potential production 
in areas that are defense-unique [Ref. 20, p. 26]. This belief supports the National 
Military Strategy's guidance, that it is crucial to maintain the research and development 
capabilities to provide product improvements, modernization, and technological 
innovation to support our forces. The loss of the engineering support provided by 
AlliedSignal could negatively impact the Army's development of future gas turbine 
engines. Whatever the justification for the preservation of a critical component of the 
industrial base, mobilization planning consists of a variety of activities. 
1.        The Mobilization Process 
The planning for industrial preparedness is initiated once the Defense Guidance is 
received from the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Staff receives from the Unified and 
Specified Commanders, a list of critical weapon systems and components. This input is 
used to develop a DoD prioritized listing of critical weapon systems and components 
[Ref. 16. p. 109]. Each military service then develops a list of respective critical weapon 
systems and components. The services' selections are then incorporated into the 
Industrial Preparedness Planning List (IPPL). 
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a. Industrial Preparedness Planning List 
The IPPL is divided into two sections. The first section includes major 
end items such as tanks, and the second section includes major components such as tank 
engines. Each service must submit it's IPPL to the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
Industrial and International Programs and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). These 
agencies then develop their respective IPPLs [Ref.14, p. 109]. The listed items are then 
placed within the surge and mobilization plans. 
b. Objectives of Mobilization Planning 
The objectives of mobilization planning are to plan the total requirement 
for post-mobilization day production of the critical weapon systems and items listed in 
the IPPL and identify planned emergency producers. Planning is accomplished by 
utilizing one of the following methods: 1) DD Form 1519, 2) Data Item Description 3) 
special studies and 4) Direct Industrial Base Plan (DIBP) [Ref. 16, p. 110]. An analysis 
of these methods used to accomplish the mobilization objective is contained in 
Hernandez's thesis. 
c. Objectives of Surge Planning 
Surge planning is an assessment of the costs and efforts related to 
increasing peacetime production rates of a contractor. Until 1993, the plan was for 
AlliedSignal to surge from a production rate of 30 engines per month to 90 engines per 
month. Each Service updates its surge production plan annually to allow for changes in 
requirements [Ref. 16, p. 112]. 
Preserving the capability to expand of air, ground, and maritime forces 
requires foresight and political support to layaway infrastructure, stockpile critical 
materials, protect the defense industrial base. A key element in responding to this 
challenge is Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR). This national process integrates 
actions to increase our emergency preparedness posture in response to crisis.   These 
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actions are implemented to reduce the amount of lead time associated with responding to 
a national emergency [Ref. 21, p. 25]. 
With the lack of a current superpower foe, it would appear that the United 
States will not have a near term requirement to mobilize its industrial base to the 
magnitude required to win World War II. The possibility of U.S. participation in a 
smaller conflict, such as the Gulf War, may require limited surge production of certain 
critical items. 
C. SPARE ENGINE AND SPARE PARTS OVERVIEW 
The availability of spare parts is a major factor in tank fleet readiness. During the 
Gulf War, the Army removed numerous items from the assembly floor to support its tank 
fleet [Ref. 16, p. 114]. This raised serious questions concerning the adequacy of Army 
reserve stock levels in a time of war. Currently, the Army maintains 350 complete Ml 
tank engines in its war reserve. The modular design of the engine allows for the 
removal of an unserviceable component. Once an engine fails, unit-level maintenance 
removes the bad module and installs a new module. For this reason, the Army has a 
varying number of modules in the system being repaired and replaced in inventory. The 
Army believes that it has a sufficient amount of war reserve engines and modules to 
support its tank fleet in time of crisis. 
Thus, the Army opted to cease production of new engines and modules. The 
Army and AlliedSignal developed the two courses of action with regard to adequate spare 
parts production and both engineering and logistical support. 
D. ANALYSIS 
This section will analyze the two options in regard to surge production and spare 
parts production. There are factors that affect mobilization planning with equal weight. 
Figure 3 illustrates the re-start schedule from a cold base. This timeline is pertinent to 
either option as they both permit the production base to go "cold." Additionally, the loss 
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of actual production will result in the disappearance of vendors whose services are no 
longer needed, or who cannot remain profitable due to reduced workload. 
The loss of vendors is a problem that AlliedSignal has dealt with throughout its 
production of the AGT 1500. From 1993 to 1994, 26 suppliers of AGT 1500 parts have 
either consolidated or closed their facilities. An example of the impact that a vendor's 
leaving the marketplace has on a production is as follows: 
A company that provided a part called a swirler notified AlliedSignal that it was 
going out of business. AlliedSignal found another capable source to provide the part. 
AlliedSignal invested $50,000 to tool the new source and an undetermined amount of 
money to qualify the source's processes. A year after selection, the source is continuing 
to produce unacceptable rates of scrap and rework. Consequently, deliveries are normally 
one to two months behind schedule. As the vendor struggles to rectify his problems, the 
cost of a swirler has increased from $800 per unit to $1,500 [Ref. 22, p. 2]. 
1.        Option One:  The Army Should Retain AlliedSignal as the 
Contractor, Mothball SAEP in Three Years, and Relocate to Another 
Facility 
As mentioned earlier, this option includes complete layaway of SAEP, extensive 
layoff of the workforce, selling of equipment and relocation of the facility. 
a.        Surge Requirements 
This option provides the Army a surge capacity of 10 engines per month. 
With operations remaining at SAEP, the equipment and test facilities, and workforce will 
be present for contingency operations. Should it prove cost-ineffective to remain at 
SAEP, the operation will in all likelihood move to Phoenix, Arizona. Phoenix is where 
AlliedSignal's main headquarters is located. The Army would then have to evaluate the 
cost of moving enough equipment from SAEP to the new facility to retain production 
capacity.   If it proves not cost-effective to move the equipment, then the Army would 
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probably opt to retain zero capacity to produce new tank engines and modules. In the 
event that emergency conditions warrant the reconstitution of the production line, the 
Army would have to locate a facility large enough to handle production requirements. 
Reconstitution of the tank engine production line will take 36-48 months. This time will 
vary depending on how long the production line has been "cold." The longer the break in 
production lasts, the more time and money it will cost the Army to reconstitute the 
production line. These increases are derived from training and certification of the 
workforce and manufacturing processes required to achieve newly-manufactured engines. 
b.        Spare Parts 
With regard to spare parts, this option provides the least cost to the Army 
for spare parts produced by AlliedSignal. Currently, AlliedSignal produces 16 sole- 
source critical parts for the AGT 1500. These options will provide the capacity to 
produce 150 recouperators per month [Ref. 23, p. 6]. TACOM expects Option One to 
benefit from the anticipated lower overhead of a COCO facility. This reduced overhead 
will make spare parts more affordable and retain the engineering support base. The 
disadvantage provided by this option is the amount of spares that the Army must initially 
stockpile to provide support during the move. TACOM designed this spare parts build- 
ahead program to reduce the risk of not having enough spare parts to meet engine 
overhaul and field support requirements. 
2.        Option Two: The Army Should Retain AlliedSignal as Contractor, 
Establish a Dual-use Lease and Downsize SAEP 
This option includes downsizing SAEP's IPE 68 percent, active floor space 40 
percent and active structures 41 percent. The Army will establish a dual-use lease with 
AlliedSignal while retaining capacity to produce 10 AGT 1500's and 25 commercial 
engines per month [Ref. 23, p. 9]. 
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a.        Surge Requirements 
The retention of a downsized S AEP affords the Army the best opportunity 
to reconstitute the production line. Granted, analysis shows that it will take the same 
amount of time to reestablish the production line as in Option One. The key difference is 
that the floor space necessary to surge to 10 engines per month will always be readily 
available. If the Army mothballs all IPE located at SAEP, AlliedSignal will have the 
equipment necessary to provide increased surge production capabilities. 
b.        Spare Parts 
Option Two provides the advantage of keeping the production processes of 
spare parts intact. By retaining the production facility, the Army will not have to 
recertify the processes and train a workforce. This option reduces the risk associated with 
a break in the production of spare parts. TACOM predicts that remaining at SAEP will 
cost the Army more in the long run for its spare parts. It remains to be seen if the 
downsizing of SAEP will reduce overhead rates low enough to make spares affordable. 
E.        SUMMARY 
From a mobilization and spare parts perspective, Option Two provides the 
greatest advantage to the Army. By selecting this option, the Army reduces the risk of 
allowing the tank engine production line to "cold." Leaving the facility at SAEP provides 
AlliedSignal the ability to keep the crucial production process of the recouperator 
uninterrupted. Additionally, the capacity to produce at least 10 newly-manufactured 
engines per month provides some insurance for the Army to meet future demand 
requirements. Option One does not provide the ability to reconstitute the production line; 
unless the Army decides to move the aging equipment from SAEP. This option has the 
greatest long-term cost saving potential for spare parts production. While it is the least 
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VI.      OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS CONSIDERATIONS 
A.        INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss operational effectiveness factors as they relate to the two 
options under consideration to preserve the tank engine industrial base. The analysis will 
focus on both engine performance and durability risks associated with the closure of the 
tank engine production line. This section will introduce the three alternatives that will 
meet the tank fleet's engine requirements. These alternatives are: newly-manufactured 
engines, remanufactured engines, and overhauled engines. 
• New Engines: Engines manufactured by AlliedSignal to specifications and 
standards maintained in the technical data package (TDP). The manufacturer 
assembles the engine with all new parts and tests them to specific performance 
parameters. Newly-manufactured engines come with a durability warranty and 
cost approximately $500,000. 
• Overhauled Engines: Engines restored to a completely serviceable 
condition as prescribed by maintenance serviceability standards included in a 
depot maintenance work requirement (DMWR). Overhauled engine work 
follows an "inspect and repair only as necessary" philopsophy. Depots 
normally accomplish overhaul work. Overhauled engines are tested to 
performance parameters and as many parts from the engine are reused and 
reclaimed to keep costs as low as possible. Approximate cost of an overhauled 
engine is $60,000. TACOM and AlliedSignal are negotiating durability 
warranties for overhauled engines. 
• Remanufactured Engines: There is no agreed upon definition between 
TACOM and AlliedSignal as to level of repair of a remanufactured engine. 
Preliminary indications are that a remanufactured engine will be like a newly- 
manufactured engine, in both performance and durability. AlliedSignal will use 
a developed process to employ a mixture of new and used components that 
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have been returned to original tolerances. A remanufactured engine will carry 
a durability warranty. Approximate cost of a remanufactured engine is 
$260,000. 
B.   BACKGROUND 
The Army's decision to utilize Army depot overhauled AGT 1500 engines raised 
concerns at AlliedSignal regarding engine durability and performance. This concern was 
founded on the Ml tank being originally fielded with a gross vehicle weight of 60 tons. 
Currently, the M1A2 is expected to weigh 70 tons. From 1980 to present day, the AGT 
1500 has had no performance improvements incorporated within its design. The original 
performance specifications have degraded 30 percent due to: increased vehicle weight, 
and addition of a nuclear, biological and chemical protection system [Ref. 10, p. 9]. 
AlliedSignal also contended that engines overhauled at ANAD were not meeting engine 
durability standards. AlliedSignal proposed to the Army that it should continue the 
purchase of newly-manufactured engines or remanufactured engines to meet its M1A2 
Upgrade Program's objectives. This perceived degradation of both engine performance 
and durability led the armor community to review these allegations. 
1.        Performance Risk 
a.        Mobility Effects On Tank Surrivability 
The Mounted Warfare Battlespace Laboratory at Fort Knox Kentucky, 
employed an independent firm to perform modeling and simulation to compare the 
performance of new engines versus overhauled engines. The study compared an engine at 
100 percent capability against an engine that's performance is rated at 90 percent of 
original performance specification. The 90 percent standard is the performance 
specification that an overhauled engine is required to meet. The model illustrated that the 
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largest difference in engine performance was two miles per hour on soft soil [Ref. 24, p. 
!]• 
A tank force was modeled to assess what impact the difference in speeds 
would have on tank survivability.  The model was event sequenced, utilizing a European 
tactical scenario. The result of the simulation was that there was no discernible statistical 
difference between the two engines. 
b. Engine Comparison Against Requirement 
A comparison of engine performance was completed by General Dynamics 
Land Systems, the prime contractor for the Ml tank. The model compared the 100 
percent performance capability engine to a 90 percent performance capable engine. The 
study showed that the 100 percent engine did out-perform the 90 percent engine. 
Unfortunately, neither engine met the performance specifications set forth for the 
M1A1E2 (M1A2) acquisition program. 
Conclusions drawn from the modeling were: 1) the difference in the tank 
speeds does not provide a statistically discernible increase in tank survivability, 2) the 
small difference in tank speed infers that engines overhauled at ANAD provide 98 percent 
of required horsepower 3) Neither overhauled nor newly-manufactured engines met the 
performance specifications required by the M1A2 acquisition program. Even though the 
overhauled engines were actually very close to meeting the performance of a 100 percent 
engine, performance was lacking. It appeared AlliedSignal would have to incorporate 
improvements into the engine's design to achieve required performance objectives. 
2. Durability Risk 
The user's requirement for engine durability is that thepowertrain must meet a 50 
percent probability of achieving 4000 miles without a durability failure [Ref. 25, p. 10]. 
The power train consists of the engine, transmission and final drives. 
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AlliedSignai made the claim that a new engine will achieve a Mean Time Between 
Overhaul (MTBO) of approximately 2200 hours (with improved recouperator) and that an 
overhauled engine will demonstrate a MTBO between 300-600 hours. The armor school 
had difficulty in responding to this point of contention for the following reasons: 
• Data specifically addressing time between engine failure and replacement is 
scarce. Data supplied from the field depicts time between engine replacement 
varying from 2200 hours to 732 hours [Ref. 24, p. 4]. Sources do not 
differentiate between the use of a newly-manufactured engine and those 
engines that have had modules previously replaced. 
• The Army had no requirement to track overhauled engine durability statistics. 
Therefore, data regarding overhauled engines was severely lacking. 
The lack of hard statistical evidence prompted the armor center to view with skepticism, 
AlliedSignal's recommendation to continue the purchase of either new AGT 1500's or 
remanufactured engines. The Army decided that it must gather data to prove the actual 
time between failures of overhauled engines. 
3.        Engine Testing 
The Army conducted testing of overhauled engines for the following reasons: 1) 
there was low confidence in available overhauled engine data, 2) overhauled engine 
durability was unknown, 3) good overhauled engine durability data is essential to accurate 
analysis, 4) the test should provide ample data to conduct a thorough evaluation of engine 
durability. 
a.        Conduct Of The Test 
Program Management Office (PM) Abrams initiated a 25 engine evaluation 
spanning the period from February 1993 to May 1994 at a cost of $5M. All but one of the 
test engines had been overhauled to the latest Depot Maintenance Work Requirement 
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(DMWR). All four modules on all engines had been overhauled, and selection of the 
engines was conducted at random. Ten engines were sent to the National Training Center 
(NTC) for use by rotational training units. This utilization by troops would provide 
operational test conditions. Seven engines were sent to Yuma Proving Grounds (YPG) 
and eight engines were sent to Aberdeen Proving Grounds (APG). The engines sent to 
YPG and APG were evaluated to the tank-level durability requirement. Test and 
evaluation vehicles at these two locations were weighted to 67.7 tons in order to closely 
resemble current production vehicle combat-loaded weight [Ref. 25, p. 2]. 
Each engine was run until it failed. After engine failure verification, each 
engine was sent to AlliedSignal for a detailed failure analysis. This failure analysis 
identified the specific cause of the failure and highlighted any other issues with the 
overhaul process or configuration [Ref. 26, p. 2]. The detailed failure analysis was sent to 
ANAD. ANAD reviewed AlliedSignal's findings and responded accordingly. These two 
sources provided verification of processes, quality, overhaul activity, or DMWR 
associated failure causes. 
b. Engine Requirement 
The minimum engine durability requirement is 8,281 MMBF [Ref. 22, p. 
3]. This figure is the minimum engine durability to fully satisfy the sustainment and Ml 
and M1A2 Tank Upgrade Program requirements. 
The test utilized an engine durability failure definition of any malfunction 
that, after troubleshooting in accordance with published technical manuals, requires a 
module replacement. 
c. Evaluation Results 
There is only one definable, quantifiable engine-level requirement for 
durability. This standard is part of the tank-level powertrain durability requirement. 
Therefore, the evaluation of overhauled engine durability centers on the results of the 
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fifteen engines tested at APG and YPG. Results as of May 25, 1994, indicated an 
overhauled engine durability of 3,860 MMBF. This is well below the tank-level 
requirement of 8,281 MMBF [Ref. 26, p. 3]. 
The detailed analysis to both fully evaluate failure causes and determine 
recommended improvements to the overhaul process included all 23 engine failures and 
detailed failure analysis. At the time of final analysis, AlliedSignal and ANAD had 
responded to 18 detailed failure analysis reports. 
d        Recommended Overhaul Process Improvements 
A list of overhaul process improvements was generated from the detailed 
failure analysis, depot evaluation, PM Abrams and TACOM review, and durability 
projections. The recommended improvements will improve overhauled engine durability 
from 3,860 MMBF to a projected 9,124 MMBF [Ref. 26, p. 4]. This is a 136 percent 
improvement and exceeds the engine durability requirement. Of course, as with most 
improvements, comes a higher price tag. 
The recommended service life extension program (SLEP) will increase the 
unit funding cost (UFC) from $64, 876 to a projected price of $91, 606, or a 41% increase 
[Ref. 26, p. 4]. This cost is significantly lower than the price tag of a new engine at 
$500,000 and that of a remanufactured engine at $260,000. 
The following is the list of recommended changes to the overhaul process: 
• Incorporate Improved Recouperator ECP. 
• Do not mix resistance and laser style recouperator plate pairs. 
• Implement Turbine Blade parts reclamation procedure. 
• Use 100 percent laser welding recuperator plate pairs during overhaul of an 
engine. 
• Require mandatory replacement of the combustor curl. 
• Revise DMWR minimum output power requirement from 1350 to 1400 shaft 
horsepower. 
72 
• Implement detailed overhauled engine data collection at the depot. 
• Institute periodic control testing of overhauled engines. 
• Implement a quality and process audit and review program. 
• Rewrite the AGT 1500 DMWR. 
• Develop and implement process sheets. 
e. Conclusions 
The Army utilized the 25 engine test and detailed analysis to arrive at the 
determination that the improved overhauled engine program is the most cost-effective 
solution to meet it's tank engine requirements. This program will satisfy the sustainment 
requirements for the fielded tank fleet, the Ml and M1A2 Upgrade Program and the 
armor community's war fighting needs. 
C.       ANALYSIS 
This section will analyze the two options in respect to their ability to support the 
three alternatives to newly-manufactured engines 
1. Option One: The Army Mothballs SAEP, Retains AUiedSignal as 
Contractor and Relocates to Another Facility 
• Overhauled Engines: this option provides the Army the capability to perform 
overhaul work on the engines. Overhaul of the engine includes the service life 
extension program (SLEP), which is designed to provide engineering 
improvements to increase engine durability. It does provide the capacity for 
AUiedSignal to continue both the manufacture of critical sole source parts, and 
technology insertions. The main drawback to this course of action is that there 
is increased risk associated with the movement of certifiable processes. While 
AUiedSignal is remaining as the contractor, the shutting down of a process, 
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movement of equipment, and training of a workforce could lead to initial 
quality deficiencies. 
• Remanufactured Engines: relocating the operations to a smaller facility, 
without moving the necessary equipment, will not support remanufacturing of 
AGT 1500 engines. Floor space for remanufacturing of engines is 
approximately the same as for production of newly-manufactured engines. 
Should the SLEP not increase durability to acceptable levels, the capacity to 
produce remanufactured engines may not be available under this option. 
Testing of actual remanufactured engines would have to take place to ascertain 
if engine durability would achieve the tank level requirement. 
2.        Option Two:  The Army Downsizes SAEP, and Institutes a Dual-use 
Lease With AlliedSignal 
The analysis of this option is based on SAEP's retention throughout the 
time period that support of the AGT 1500 is required. Relocation after the three 
year evaluation period would generate the advantages and disadvantages 
mentioned in Option One's analysis. 
• Overhauled Engines: would benefit from a stable environment and workforce. 
Retention of SAEP would not require training and certification of the 
workforce and manufacturing processes. This reduces the Army's risk of 
supporting its tank fleet and depot engine overhaul program with spare parts 
and related logistical support. 
• Remanufactured Engines: the stable workforce and ample floor space at 
SAEP, provide the Army with an alternative to newly-manufactured and 
overhauled engines. The machinery that is expected to remain at SAEP will 
provide the capacity for production of both newly-manufactured and 
remanufactured engines, and component parts for the SLEP. Remanufactured 
engines could be a viable alternative to SLEP engines, if performance of these 
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engines is found to be lacking.   Remanufactured engines may also be a more 
cost-effective alternative than newly-manufactured engines. 
D.        SUMMARY 
The Army analyzed the three alternatives to newly-manufactured engines: 
overhauled, SLEP overhauled, and remanufactured engines. After extensive modeling, 
simulation, and actual testing, the Army arrived at the determination that SLEP 
overhauled engines would provide the necessary performance and durability required to 
support the tank fleet. TACOM believes that either option will be able to provide the 
support necessary to maintain both the tank fleet and meet user requirements. 
The relocation of AlliedSignal's capabilities will increase the risk of both 
performing engine overhaul and production of quality components. Eventually, the 
familiarity with manufacturing processes will enable the workforce to produce quality 
components and service. The retention of SAEP will provide the experienced workforce, 
equipment, and floor space that allows the Army to mitigate this risk. The SAEP affords 
the Army the ability to conduct engine overhaul work, while maintaining both 
remanufacturing and new engine production capacity. Therefore, from an operational 
effectiveness standpoint, the retention of SAEP provides the Army both the best and least 




VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The tank engine industrial base is an essential element of the armor force's 
readiness posture. Although there are commercial capabilities available to produce an 
acceptable engine, both the cost and time of developing a new source and engine design 
are prohibitive. Allowing the tank engine industrial base to go "cold" could jeopardize the 
tank fleet's readiness, as well as future development of turbine engines for ground vehicle 
applications. 
The Army, Congress, and AlliedSignal committed themselves to preserving the 
tank engine industrial base. The Army requested from Congress more than $180M over 
the next three years to maintain its capability to produce tank engines [Ref. 20, p. 9]. 
AlliedSignal and the Army have begun the downsizing of SAEP to create a more cost- 
efficient facility. Additionally, the Army and AlliedSignal are negotiating a dual-use lease 
of SAEP to allow an expanded commercial usage of idle IPE. The potential increase in 
private industry utilization of a GOCO facility can reduce the cost of Government items by 
lowering the overhead rate. The Army made a determination to maintain the SAEP for a 
period of at least three years. 
During this time period the Army will evaluate SAEP's ability to produce 
affordable spare parts and logistical services. At the end of this evaluation period, the 
Army will decide if it is more cost-effective to remain at SAEP, or to relocate operations 
to another, more cost-efficient facility. 
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions encapsulate the advantages and disadvantages of the 
two options for preserving the tank engine industrial base. A comparative analysis of the 
two options will succeed the summary. 
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1. Option One: The Army Should Mothball SAEP, Retain 
AlliedSignal's Capabilities and Relocate the Facility 
This course of action allows the Army to retain the production of spare parts, and 
both engineering and logistical support necessary to maintain the tank fleet's readiness. 
The Army would totally lay away SAEP, conduct extensive layoffs of the workforce, and 
either sell or mothball unnecessary equipment. 
a. Advantages of Implementing This Option 
• The production of spare parts and SLEP overhauled engines can be executed 
under this option. 
• Costs of spare parts and both engineering and logistical support will be lower 
in the long run. 
b. Disadvantages of Implementing This Option 
• Requires upfront funding of $26.4M for a spares build-ahead program. 
• Unless equipment and 8,000, the Army does not need anymore new engines. 
• The workload generated from spare parts production and overhaul of engines 
will allow for the preservation of the tank engine industrial base, including 
engineering support. 
• Unless equipment and floor space are provided to allow newly-manufactured 
engine capacity, the Army will not have the ability to rapidly produce new 
engines for either its own use or FMS. 
• Utilization of an untrained workforce will increase risk of meeting production 
schedules and quality standards. 
• The uncertainty of the development, production, and fielding of the follow-on 
main battle tank could leave the Army with the M1A2 for the next 20 to 30 
years. 
78 
2.        Option Two: The Army Should Downsize SAEP, Retain 
AlliedSignal's Services, and Establish a Dual-use Lease 
This option allows the Army to sustain SAEP for the near term and retain, intact, 
AlliedSignal's capability to: manufacture spare parts, provide both logistical and 
engineering support, as well as perform engine overhaul work. Additionally, this option 
maintains the capacity to manufacture new engines. 
a. Advantages of Implementing This Option 
• The experienced "core" workforce is retained intact. 
• The stability of both the workforce and manufacturing processes provides 
continued quality assurance of spare parts and support activities. 
• Retention of IPE and floor space will mitigate the risk of meeting unforeseen 
demands for new engines. 
• Retention of engineering knowledge will assist in future research and 
development of gas turbine engines. 
• The retention of the capacity to produce newly-manufactured engines 
decreases the amount of time required to mobilize the production line to surge 
capacity in a time of emergency. 
b. Disadvantages of Implementing This Option 
• The costs of spare parts and logistical support are increased due to extremely 
high overhead rates. 
• Attempts to lower overhead rates could lead to a termination of engineering 
support. 
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3.        Comparative Analysis 
Analysis of the courses of action was conducted by comparing the following 
criteria. Workforce issues, discussed in Chapter III, include factors such as: 1) retention 
of a "core" workforce, 2) training and certification times for the workforce and 
manufacturing processes. Costs discussed in Chapter IV, incorporate issues of: 1) facility 
layaway, 2) closure penalties 3) spare parts build-ahead program 3) environmental 
restoration programs, 4) human resources, 5) equipment removal, 6) logistical support, 7) 
SLEP, and 8) spare parts. Chapter VI examined operational effectiveness issues to 
include: 1) remanufactured and overhauled engines, 2) engine durability and performance 
requirements, and 3) SLEP. 
Option One, the layaway of SAEP and relocation of overhaul capabilities, spare 
parts production, and both logistical and engineering support is the most cost- effective 
alternative. Implementation of either option incurs the estimated $42M cost of 
reestablishing the production line. Option Two is the least cost-effective alternative; as 
the predicted overhead rates increase the cost of spare parts and logistical support to 
excessive levels. Option Two could become competitive in a cost perspective if the 
restructuring of SAEP reduces the overhead rate to an acceptable level. Additionally, if 
the Army is forced to implement the entire $422M environmental remediation requirement 
once SAEP is vacated, then the cost to implement either option would almost be equal. 
Option One is the best option from the operational effectiveness, mobilization, and 
workforce perspectives. The retention of a skilled, experienced workforce and 
uninterrupted manufacturing process, results in the continued quality of the product. The 
retention of SAEP provides a constant production of spare parts and logistical support for 
the engine overhaul program. Relocation of the facility results in an increased risk of 
reestablishing manufacturing processes and training of a new workforce. During this 
training and certification period, quality of workmanship can be expected to impact 
operational effectiveness. The retaining of SAEP also mitigates the amount of risk 
associated with mobilization of the industrial base. 
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The SAEP will retain the capacity to provide surge production of at least ten 
newly manufactured engines per month. Current plans for location of the facility do not 
include surge capacity. The ability to produce new engines will greatly reduce the Army's 
risk of failing to meet unexpected demands for newly-manufactured engines generated 
from emergencies, FMS, or both. 
Either option provides the Army the ability to support its current tank fleet and the 
M1A2 Upgrade Program with quality engines, spare parts, and support activities. The 
difference is centered on timing. Option Two's ability to produce quality service is likely 
to take more time to establish. Option One will not require the additional time to 
reestablish the learning curve and recertify manufacturing processes. If relocation is 
deemed necessary, the Army plans to utilize a spare parts build-ahead program. This 
program will mitigate the risk of meeting spare parts requests by maintaining a stockage of 
spare components. In conclusion, the Army believes that SLEP AGT 1500 engine will 
meet the needs of the tank fleet, and preserve the tank engine industrial base, at least for 
the near term. Within the scope of this thesis, the recommended solution for preserving 
the tank engine industrial base is to continue operation of SAEP until SLEP engines prove 
that they can meet performance and durability requirements, and it is no longer cost- 
effective to remain at SAEP. 
4.        Additional Conclusions 
The following additional conclusions were brought forth during the research of this 
thesis. These observations could favorably impact upon the Army's ability to preserve the 
tank engine industrial base into the future. 
a.        Dual-use Leases 
Dual-use leases will assist the Government and private industry reduce the 
cost of acquisitions of military equipment. With the reduced number of large scale 
production runs of military items, the DoD is forced to mothball large industrial 
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complexes, such as SAEP. The establishment of dual-use leases will enable private 
industry to utilize existing facilities (for a cost) to produce commercial items. This action 
will eliminate the DoD's requirement to provide maintenance and caretaking of these 
mothballed facilities. The DoD must establish policies and guidance that will allow for 
rapid institution of dual-use leases at GOCO facilities. 
b.       Subcontractor Base 
The DoD should monitor the welfare of the third-tier vendor base. These 
small businesses play an integral role in the DoD industrial base. DoD must that realize 
the loss of small businesses can hamper DoD's ability to procure vital components to 
maintain system's readiness and upgrades of existing fielded equipment. 
c.        Dual-use Technology 
Once requirements for newly-manufactured items cease, the selection of 
technologies that provide a military and commercial application reduce DoD's risk of 
providing support of fielded systems. Additionally, DoD must thoroughly evaluate 
acquiring systems and components that can be utilized in a variety of military applications. 
An engine that can be employed in a tank, a self-propelled artillery system, a armored 
recovery vehicle, or an infantry fighting vehicle will be of great benefit to the Army. The 
commonality of components, such as engines, provides the following advantages: 1) 
reduced cost of spare parts and logistical support 2) fewer repair specialties and related 
training, 3) reduction of inventory requirements for spare parts, and 4) enhanced 
synchronization of maneuver forces on the battle field. 
C.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
The  following  recommendations  are  made  that  will  ensure  the  long-term 
preservation of the tank engine industrial base. 
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1. General Recommendations 
The Army should retain SAEP and institute the SLEP to support the upgrade of 
existing AGT 1500 gas turbine engines. This course of action will preserve the industrial 
base and allow for the incorporation of future technological insertions to the design of the 
engine to meet any changes in performance requirements. Execution of this option 
reduces the risk of meeting unforeseen demands and mobilization requirements. 
2. Specific Recommendations 
The following are additional recommendations made within the scope of this 
thesis: 
• Increase Government support for dual-use leases. 
• Monitor the third-tier vendor base's health during the restructuring process. 
• Thoroughly evaluate the use of dual use-technology and applications in DoD 
systems. 
• Develop policies and guidance that reduce the amount of time to negotiate and 
implement dual-use leases at GOCO facilities. 
• The Army must conduct actual testing of SLEP AGT 1500 engines to ascertain 
their performance and durability. 
3. Recommendations for Further Research 
The following areas should be studied further and in greater detail to ascertain 
their impact on the preservation of the tank engine industrial base during the 
implementation of the current proposed option. Some of these issues will have additional 
applications to other DoD agencies grappling with similar issues. 
• Dual-use leases. What is the current DoD policy governing the establishment 
of dual-use leases and is there a need to change this policy to enhance the 
implementation of dual-use leases? 
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Reconstitution:   Can the tank engine industrial base reestablish itself after a 
prolonged shutdown? 
Workload allocation between original equipment manufactures and depots: 
Should the depot system continue to provide overhaul and upgrade capacity 
for fielded systems or should this workload be returned to industry to keep the 
industrial base "warm"? 
Dual-use  technologies:     Can  dual-use  technology  provide  industry  the 
capability   to   readily   transfer   from   commercial   production   to   military 
production? 
Government-owned and contractor-operated facilities:  Has the reduced need 
of large production runs of major end items eliminated the need for GOCO 
facilities, and can COCO facilities provide the assets to meet future DoD 
needs? 
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APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions were derived from briefing slides obtained from 
TACOM. 
1. Durability: The probability that an item will successfully survive usage to 
meet its requirement 
2. Engine Failure: After troubleshooting in accordance with current technical 
manuals requires an engine or modules replacement. A failure always leads to a 
replacement, but a replacement is not always caused from a failure. 
3. MTBR and MMBR: Mean Time Between Replacement and Mean Miles 
Between Replacement: Replacement is an engine or module replaced for cause. 
4. MTBF and MMBF: Mean Time Between Failure and Mean Miles Between 
Failures. A failure which is engine caused and requires either an engine or module 
replacement for cause. 
5. Industrial Plant Equipment (IPE): IPE is equipment used in the 
manufacturing, maintenance, supply, processing, assembly or research and development 
operations of an item. It includes machinery and equipment capable of: cutting, grinding, 
shaping, forming, measuring, heating or altering the physical and electrical, or chemical 
properties of material, components, or end items [Ref. 14, p. 149]. 
6. RO: Requirements Objective: Is the minimum objective quantity of an asset 
desired to be stocked at any given time. 
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